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ABSTRACT 
In wireless sensor networks, more so generally than in other types of distributed 
systems, clock synchronization is crucial since by having this service available, several 
applications such as media access protocols, object tracking, or data fusion, would 
improve their performance. In this dissertation, we propose a set of algorithms to 
achieve accurate time synchronization in large multihop wireless networks. 
First, we present a fully distributed and asynchronous algorithm that has been 
designed to exploit the large number of global constraints that have to be satisfied by 
a common notion of time in a multihop network. For example, the sum of the clock 
offsets along any cycle in the network must be zero at any instant. This leads to the 
concept of "spatial smoothing." By imposing the large number of global constraints 
for all the cycles in the multihop network, these time estimates can be smoothed and 
made more accurate. 
The algorithm functions by simple asynchronous broadcasts at each node. Chang-
ing the time reference node for synchronization is also easy, consisting simply of one 
node switching on adaptation, and another switching it off. It has been implemented 
on a Berkeley motes testbed of forty nodes, and comparative evaluation against a 
leading algorithm is presented. 
Next, considering that most of the clock synchronization protocols that have been 
developed do not provide means to detect security attacks which could render them 
useless, we present a secure network-wide clock synchronization protocol. At the same 
time, this protocol allows the nodes to securely discover the network's topology by 
ii 
detecting and isolating all links that have fallen under the control of attackers. The 
protocol detects the attacks using only timing information under certain conditions. 
It has been implemented on an IMote2 testbed of twenty five nodes. Experimental 
results are provided. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Wireless Sensor Networks 
Technological advances made in recent years in the fields of microelectronics and 
wireless communications have enabled the integration of sensors, actuators and ra-
dios, which has lead to the development and deployment of wireless sensor networks. 
Wireless sensor networks have grown in popularity and the applications that can be 
developed for such networks are widespread, ranging from target tracking surveil-
lance [2,3], to biomedical health monitoring [4] and seismic sensing [5]. Along with 
these applications come new design challenges [6,7], which stem from the fact that 
a wireless sensor network has limited resources in terms of memory, computation 
power, bandwidth and energy; and design constraints based on the monitored envi-
ronment. These play a key role in determining many aspects of the network such as 
size, deployment scheme and topology. For example, in terms of resource constraints, 
the MICA2 Berkeley motes [8] use an 8-bit micro-controller running at 4 MHz with a 
limited instruction set, have only 4KB of RAM memory and can transmit up to 19.2 
kbps. They are battery powered by an inexpensive pair of AA batteries that produce 
between 2.0 and 3.2 V, and the lifetime is mainly determined by its awake duty-cycle 
and radio usage. 
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1.2 Importance of Clock Synchronization 
For several distributed applications either it is necessary for the processors to have a 
common notion of time, or to have it would improve their performance. Examples of 
these applications are authentication protocols, media access protocols, and database 
consistency [9]. In the case of wireless sensor networks, applications such as object 
tracking, environmental monitoring, TDMA scheduling, and data fusion, require some 
kind of timing service in order to determine the order in which events have unfolded 
and also the actual times of the events themselves. The synchronization would also 
allow the nodes to save energy. In wireless sensor networks, the accuracy of object 
localization or tracking is limited by the accuracy of clock synchronization [10]. When 
actuation is also performed over the network, accurate clock synchronization is needed 
to avoid delay induced instabilities, and improve control system performance [11]. 
Due to its importance, several algorithms have therefore been designed ( [12-30]) in 
order to synchronize the clocks of a distributed system over traditional networks, and 
also over wireless sensor networks. 
In this dissertation, two algorithms to achieve clock synchronization in a multihop 
wireless sensor network are presented as well as the results on their performance in 
implementations. 
For the first algorithm, the key novelty of the approach presented consists of 
a new notion of "spatial smoothing." It exploits global constraints imposed by a 
common notion of time to improve the performance of clock synchronization, and yet 
achieves this through a completely asynchronous, distributed algorithm. The heart 
of the idea is the following. Suppose Oy is the offset of the clock at node j with 
respect to the clock at a neighboring node i, at a certain time. Then an estimate 
of Oij can be formed by bilateral exchange (or broadcast) of timestamped packets 
between the neighboring nodes i and j . These estimates are, however, noisy and 
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are based only on the particular timestamped packets exchanged between the two 
neighboring nodes. Now consider any cycle formed by nodes ii, i2,.. •, in, in+i = H, 
in the multihop network. Necessarily, Y^=i ^ikik+1 = 0 must be satisfied by the very 
notion of common time. This is an example of one global constraint, and there are 
several such global constraints, one for every cycle in the graph. By taking advantage 
of these constraints, the noisy estimates Oij can be further smoothed to give better 
estimates. Imposing these global constraints can thus improve the time estimate 
at every node in a multihop network with respect to any chosen reference node. 
Essentially, this procedure allows full exploitation of all bilateral estimates, i.e., all 
global information, to synchronize the clock at every node, thus making possible the 
spatial smoothing of otherwise noisy local time estimates. 
Thus we obtain a completely distributed asynchronous algorithm, where nodes 
communicate only with their neighboring nodes, to achieve these global constraints. 
Our distributed algorithm takes advantage of all estimates of bilateral offsets all over 
the network to improve performance at every node, and not just those, say, along a 
rooted tree. The incorporation of such a large number of global constraints improves 
clock synchronization, especially in large networks where there are indeed a large 
number of such constraints. 
As noted above, this algorithm does not require any constructions such as a rooted 
tree. In fact, it does not need any global topology knowledge. Instead it only uses 
asynchronous distributed broadcasts at each node. Moreover, switching the time 
reference from one node to another is also easy. It simply consists of one node 
switching on adaptation, and another switching it off, and the entire network then 
adapts to the change. 
The results of an implementation over a 40-node Berkeley motes testbed and 
a comparison of these results with a leading clock synchronization protocol on the 
testbed are presented. 
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For the second algorithm, security is taken into account and based on theoretical 
work by Chiang et al. [1], we first develop and implement a secure clock synchroniza-
tion protocol over a single link that is able to detect man-in-the-middle attacks using 
only timing information. In man-in-the-middle attacks, the attacker intercepts mes-
sages exchanged between two nodes and relays such messages in a way that makes the 
two nodes believe that the link they share is valid, while in reality the characteristics 
of the link have been modified. For instance, delays are introduced which could affect 
the clock synchronization service. By using the secure clock synchronization protocol, 
nodes are able to impose restrictions on the kind of delays a man-in-the-middle at-
tacker can add to the packets exchanged between them. We validate the assumptions 
and properties of the theoretical protocol by means of an implementation performed 
using IMote2 motes and TinyOS 2.1. We further proceed to successfully implement 
a mechanism to detect half-duplex man-in-the-middle attackers. 
Finally, the secure clock synchronization protocol is extended to securely synchro-
nize the clocks in a multihop network. At the same time this protocol also allows 
the nodes in the network to securely discover the topology of the network. The ul-
timate goal of this secure network-wide clock synchronization protocol is to obtain a 
network-consistent clock. 
This protocol is able to detect misbehaving or compromised links, disseminate 
information regarding those links and effectively isolate them. It is divided into four 
steps: single link check, neighborhood check, network consistency check, and removal 
of network inconsistencies. 
The protocol has been implemented on a testbed comprised of 25 Crossbow IMote2 
sensor nodes on top of TinyOS 2.1. Experimental results are presented. 
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CHAPTER 2 
MOTIVATION AND RELATED 
WORK 
The applications deployed over wireless sensor networks range from environmental 
monitoring [5,31-34], health and wellness monitoring [35,36] distributed control [37], 
and object tracking [10,38], to control over networks [39-41]. Most of these appli-
cations need to determine the times of the events that occur during their execution, 
thus requiring a clock synchronization service. 
For instance, in [10], a network of directional sensors is intended to monitor a 
region which is crossed sporadically by objects assumed to be moving at nearly con-
stant velocity. Using the times at which sensors detect objects crossing their "field 
of vision," the trajectories of the objects can be determined as well as the sensor 
directions, which are also unknown a priori. 
An accurate notion of time can also be used to improve communication network 
performance. By having nodes in a wireless network synchronized, implementation 
of MAC protocols such as TDMA or SEEDEX [42] would be feasible. This can lead 
to greater throughput [43]. In addition, it can also be used to conserve energy by 
reducing collisions when nodes transmit over the shared medium, as well as sleep while 
awaiting their turn to transmit. Accurate clock synchronization can allow nodes to 
more accurately coordinate their sleep states by employing advanced duty-cycling 
schemes [44]. 
Clock synchronization has been an important topic of research for several years. 
Several algorithms have been developed, mainly for traditional wireline networks, and, 
lately, many for wireless sensor networks. This chapter presents the most important 
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references in this field beginning with the seminal work by Lamport on virtual clocks, 
followed by some important theoretical results and the main algorithms proposed for 
traditional, ad-hoc, and sensor networks. 
2.1 Virtual Clocks 
The seminal work in clock synchronization is due to Lamport [45], where the idea 
of virtual clocks is used. In his system, he defines the "happened before" relation 
(denoted by the symbol —•) as follows: 
1. If a and b are events in the same process, and a comes before b, then a —>• b. 
2. If a is the sending of a message by one process and b is the receipt of the same 
message by another process, then a —> b. 
3. If a —» b and b —»• c then a —»• c. 
4. Two distinct events a and b are said to be "concurrent" if neither a —> b nor 
b —>• a hold. 
Also, a logical clock Ci is defined as a function that assigns a real number Ci(a) to 
any event a in that process. The clock meets the following condition: For any events 
a, b in process i, if a —> 6, then Ci(a) < Q(6) as long as the following holds: 
1. If a and b are events in process Pi and a comes before b, then Cj(a) < Ci(b). 
2. If a is the sending of a message by process Pi and 6 is the receipt of the same 
message by process Pj, then Ci(a) < Cj(b). 
Finally, a total ordering "happened before" relation, denoted by => is defined. It 
extends the —> relation to a total ordering by assigning processors a priority to break 
the ties. However, the resulting total order is not unique. 
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This work also determines that in case of physical clocks, the closest that two 
clocks can get is approximately d(pr + e), where d is the diameter of the network, p 
is the drift rate of the clock, r is the time interval over which a clock synchronization 
message is sent, and e is the maximum unpredictable delay of the message. 
2.2 Theoretical Results 
Several theoretical results have been published regarding clock synchronization, the 
most important being the following: 
• In [46], Dolev and Halpern prove the impossibility of achieving clock synchro-
nization if more than a third of the nodes in the network are faulty, and give 
the requirements to be met in order to achieve it. 
• In [47], Lundelius and Lynch show that no algorithm can synchronize clocks 
exactly, and provide lower and upper bounds on how close the clock values can 
be at the same real time in a fully connected network. 
• In [48], Biaz and Welch provide a lower bound for the optimal clock synchro-
nization achievable for any network topology, taking into account the diameter 
of the network, and provide a tighter bound for a specific class of network 
topologies. 
• In [11], Graham and Kumar show that it is fundamentally impossible to es-
timate time between two clocks precisely without assuming symmetric delays. 
Clock skew can be estimated regardless, and also, after two nodes have clock 
synchronized, when one node sends a packet to the other, the sender can per-
fectly predict the time at which the packet will be received in terms of the 
receiver's clock. 
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• In [49], Gurewitz et al. propose a method to estimate the one-way delay for each 
link in an N-node network that works by summing up all single-hop one-way 
measurements made along various cyclic paths. They show that the maximal 
number of independent cyclic path delays that can be computed is smaller than 
the number of links by N-l, which means that it is not possible to uniquely 
determine the one-way delays. 
• In [50], Freris and Kumar analyze networks of clocks, and characterize what is 
determinable from what is not. 
2.3 General Network Algorithms 
The basic idea of a clock synchronization algorithm is that a node has a logical clock 
which provides a time base for all activities on a node [51], and which is derived 
from the hardware clock on the node. The algorithm executed can be viewed as a 
clock process invoked at the end of every resynchronization interval. This process is 
responsible for periodically reading the clock values at other nodes and then adjusting 
the corresponding local clock value. The algorithm must satisfy the following two 
conditions: 
1. Agreement: The offset between all non-faulty clocks in the system is bounded. 
2. Accuracy: The logical clock keeps up with the real time. 
The diverse algorithms differ in the way these conditions are specified and in the way 
the clock processes read the clock values at the other nodes. They can be divided 
into two categories: 
1. Deterministic: These guarantee an upper bound on the closeness of the synchro-
nization attainable, assuming an upper bound on transmission delays [52-55]. 
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2. Probabilistic: These do not make any assumptions about the uncertainty, and 
provide a smaller expected upper bound on the closeness of synchronization, but 
do not guarantee such a bound with probability one [56,57]. 
External 
Reference Clock 
Stratum 1 
Stratum 2 
Stratum 3 
Figure 2.1: Relationship between the various levels of NTP. 
One important algorithm which is widely used is the Network Time Protocol 
(NTP) described in [12]. As can be seen in Figure 2.1, in NTP each group of processes 
served by the synchronization protocol is organized in a hierarchical structure. The 
primary servers are located at the root level or stratum 1, and are synchronized to 
accurate external clocks. Nodes at stratum 2 are synchronized with the primary 
servers at stratum 1, nodes at stratum 3 are synchronized with nodes at stratum 2, 
and so on. To withstand possible failures in nodes or network links, nodes at the 
different strata can obtain time readings from several nodes, resulting in a redundant 
topology. To achieve synchronization, nodes exchange messages which include the 
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latest three timestamps that, together with the time at which the message is received, 
allow estimating round-trip delays and clock offsets. These estimates are then filtered 
to reduce timing noise, and a peer-selection algorithm is used to determine which 
subset is the most accurate and reliable. The resulting offsets of this subset are 
combined using a weighted-average basis, and processed by a phase-lock loop to 
produce a phase-correction term used to control the local clock. Levels close to 
the root of the subnet have better accuracy and precision relative to the external 
standard. 
2.4 Ad Hoc Networks 
An ad hoc network is a network of mobile wireless computing devices which have a 
possibly dynamical topology, there being no infrastructure. An algorithm for clock 
synchronization suitable for ad hoc networks is proposed in [13]. The basic idea of 
this algorithm is not to synchronize the local clocks of the devices but to generate 
time stamps using unsynchronized local clocks that when passed between devices will 
be transformed to the local time of the receiving device. Since these transformations 
cannot be done with high precision due to the unpredictability of the computer clocks, 
the algorithm estimates a lower and upper bound for the real time passed from the 
generation of a timestamp to its arrival in the destination, transforms such bounds to 
the time of the receiver, and subtracts the resulting values from the time of arrival in 
the destination node. This results in an interval specifying lower and upper bounds 
for the time stamp relative to the local time of the receiving node. 
The accuracy obtained is in the order of milliseconds for an implementation over 
a 100 Mbps Ethernet network. A time translation control time protocol is also devel-
oped in [11] which is suitable for control applications over networks. It is also shown 
that it is impossible to synchronize under asymmetric delays, i.e., when communica-
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tion delays in the two directions are different. 
2.5 Wireless Sensor Networks 
For wireless sensor networks which share the limitations of an ad hoc network, along 
with a need, generally, for greater energy efficiency, a few algorithms have been pro-
posed. Before describing the more important algorithms in this area, we review what 
are the sources of error in the clock synchronization process [14,58], and describe the 
most common architecture used to implement the algorithms for sensor networks, 
Berkeley motes [59]. 
2.5.1 Sources of error in the clock synchronization process 
First we define some terminology. 
Send time. This is the time spent at the sender to pass the message from the ap-
plication to the network interface. 
Access time. This is the delay incurred waiting for access to transmit on the chan-
nel, which in turn is dependent on the MAC protocol being used. 
Propagation time. This is the time in transit from the sender to the receiver, once 
the message has left the sender. This time is very small on a local network if 
the sender and receiver share access to the same physical media. 
Receive time. This is the time needed to process the message once it has arrived 
at the receiver's network interface. 
These quantities affect the latencies of communications between nodes, and are 
shown graphically in Figure 2.2. Figure 2.3 shows the difference between timestamp-
ing at the application layer and the MAC layer and how some of sources of error can 
be avoided. 
11 
Application calls send() 
Sending 
process 
Receiving, 
process 
t-'ropagationf 1 I 
i Application receives message 
Figure 2.2: Illustration of the sources of error during clock synchronization. 
2.5.2 Berkeley motes and Tiny OS 
A mote is an autonomous sensor node which provides a combination of sensing, com-
munication and computation, in a complete architecture which has been developed 
at the University of California, Berkeley [59]. 
Berkeley motes run the TinyOS Operating System, which is an open-source oper-
ating system designed for wireless embedded sensor networks. Its component-based 
architecture enables rapid implementation while minimizing code size as required by 
the severe memory constraints inherent in sensor networks [60]. Applications are 
written in nesC, which is a new language for programming structured component-
based applications that has a C-like syntax and supports the TinyOS concurrency 
model [61]. 
Over the years, motes architecture has been improved in terms of processing 
power, memory and communication capabilities. We describe some of the features 
of three different types of motes to illustrate these improvements (for more details, 
see [62,63]). 
A MICA mote [64] uses an Atmel ATmega 103 or ATmega 128L processor running 
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Figure 2.3: Illustration of two places where the timestamping can be performed. 
at 4 MHz. It has 128 KBytes of onboard flash memory to store the mote's program 
and 4 KBytes of RAM. 
It comes with 512 KBytes of flash memory to hold data, and also has a 10-bit A/D 
converter so that sensor data can be digitized. Sensors available include temperature, 
acceleration, light, sound and magnetic. Finally, the radio module consists of an RF 
Monolithics TR1000 transceiver that can operate at communication rates up to 40 
kbps. The complete system is designed to operate off an inexpensive pair of AA 
batteries that produce between 2.0 and 3.2 V. 
A MICA2 mote [8] has similar features as the MICA, but uses a different radio, 
the Chipcon CC1000, which allows a better range and better noise immunity. It also 
allows us to program the frequency at which to transmit the data, and has support for 
wireless remote reprogramming which is very helpful when there is a large number of 
motes to program. The processor has a 7.3728MHz crystal to support higher UART 
baud rates. 
An IMote2 mote [65], which is a newer generation of mote, uses an Intel PXA271 
XScale processor at 13 MHz (scalable up to 416 MHz). It has 256 KB of SRAM and 
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32 MB of SDRAM. It uses a CC2420 IEEE 802.15.4 radio module which supports a 
250 kbps rate with 16 channels in the 2.4 GHz band. 
The software side of the architecture, that is, TinyOS, has also been improved 
over the years [60]. In 2001, MICA motes were developed and programmed with 
version 0.6 which used a mix of C and Perl scripts. In September 2002, version 
1.0 appeared, which was implemented in nesC. In November 2006, version 2.0 was 
released [66]; which is a complete rewrite of the entire operating system looking to 
support greater platform flexibility by means of a newer and more powerful version 
of the nesC language and the introduction of a three layer Hardware Abstraction 
Architecture [67]. The most recent version is 2.1. 
2.5.3 Reference broadcast synchronization (RBS) 
This scheme, described in [14], uses broadcast communications to allow the receivers 
of the synchronization message (called beacon) to synchronize with one another. The 
receivers record their local time when receiving the beacon, and then they exchange 
their recorded times. With this exchange, they find their clocks' difference. By doing 
this, two of the sources of error mentioned in Section 2.5.1 are removed (sending 
time and access time), and since the propagation time is ignored (considered being 
negligible in the broadcast medium in which this scheme is used), the only possible 
error is reduced to the receiver's side (receive time), and can be generally kept very 
small by timestamping the reception at the lowest possible level. The receiver error 
was characterized by doing tests on a wireless sensor network testbed in which a 
node broadcasted packets and the phase offsets of five receivers were recorded. The 
distribution of such errors appeared Gaussian with parameters \x = 0, a — 11.1/isec. 
In order to increase the precision of the synchronization, more than one beacon 
is sent: 
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1. m reference packets (beacons) are broadcasted. 
2. Each of the n receivers records the time at which the beacon was received, 
according to its local clock. 
3. The receivers exchange their recorded times. 
4. Each receiver i can compute its offset with respect to any other receiver j as 
the average of the phase offsets implied by each beacon received by both nodes 
i and j , 
. rn 
Vienjen: Offset [U] := - £ ( T i i f c - T a ) . 
fit 
k=i 
To account for the clock skew, a least-squares linear regression is performed on 
the phase offsets. The protocol was implemented on a Berkeley motes testbed and 
it was able to keep the synchronization error between two nodes at 7.4 fj,s after a 60 
second interval. 
It should be noted that the protocol code ran on iPAQs that have more stable 
oscillators and a higher resolution (the motes were only used to provide the wireless 
communication). A multihop extension is also proposed to synchronize at least two 
groups of nodes, but it relies on effective clustering of the nodes around the broadcast 
nodes. 
To reduce communications, a scheme called post-facto synchronization is proposed 
where instead of keeping the time-synchronization process always on, a synchroniza-
tion is performed only after an event of interest happens, in order to estimate the 
phase shift at the previous time by extrapolating backwards. This however can result 
in delayed reaction to events, which can potentially affect the stability of sensor-
actuator networks. 
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2.5.4 Tiny-sync and mini-sync 
The work described in [15] assumes that the clock drift at a node is linear and of the 
form 
ti(t) = ait + bt, 
where U is the local clock in node i, a* and bi are its drift and offset parameters, and 
t is the real time. If node 1 wants to determine what are its relative drift and offset 
with respect to node 2 (ai2 and 612 respectively), an exchange of messages would take 
place in the following way (shown graphically in Figure 2.4): 
1. Node 1 sends a message to node 2, which is timestamped right before it is sent 
9X T/Q. 
2. Node 2 timestamps the reception with fy,, and returns a reply to node 1 which 
includes £&. 
3. Node 1 timestamps the reply with tr. 
Figure 2.4: Exchange of messages to determine relative drift and offset between two 
nodes. 
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The three timestamps (t0,tb,tr) form a data-point which limits the values of pa-
rameters ai2 and bu- Since to —> tt, and £& —> tr, the following inequalities should 
hold for the data points: 
t0(t) < a12tb(t) + 612 , 
tr(t) > al2tb(t) + b12 . 
After the acquisition of a few (at least two) data-points, an estimation of the 
parameters can be performed by solving the linear programming problem given by 
the inequalities formed by the data-points. As new data-points arrive, the number 
of data-points to keep can be reduced to only two by determining which ones result 
in the best estimates (tiny-sync method). Alternatively, up to 40 points can be used 
with a different way to eliminate old data-points (mini-sync method). The tiny-sync 
method results in a suboptimal solution. 
To synchronize a multihop network, it is assumed that the sensor network is 
organized as a tree hierarchy with sensor nodes in the lowest layer, one (or more) 
root node(s), and possibly several layers of intermediate nodes. It is also assumed 
that data is fused at the intermediate nodes. So, instead of synchronizing the entire 
network to one unique clock, all nodes reporting to the same intermediate node should 
synchronize with such intermediate node using the exchange of messages described. 
Therefore, nodes in layer i synchronize with nodes in layer i — 1 and so on. The 
performance of the algorithm was tested on an 802.11b multihop ad hoc network, 
achieving an accuracy of 3 ms over a single hop. 
2.5.5 Timing-sync protocol for sensor networks (TPSN) 
In [16], a protocol, called TPSN, is proposed to achieve network-wide synchronization. 
In this protocol, the first step is to create a hierarchical topology in the network where 
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every node is assigned a level in the hierarchical structure. To create this hierarchical 
topology, the root (which is assigned level 0) initiates a level discovery phase when 
the network deploys, by broadcasting a level-discovery packet, which contains the 
identity and level of the sender. Once the neighboring nodes receive this packet, they 
assign themselves a level which is one greater than the level they have received and 
broadcast a new leveLdiscovery packet. This process continues until every node is 
assigned a level. Once a node has assigned itself a level, then further leveLdiscovery 
packets received are discarded. 
Once the level discovery phase ends, a synchronization phase starts where a node 
belonging to a level i synchronizes to level i-1. In this latter phase, a two-way message 
exchange occurs, and the clock drift and propagation delay are calculated, with the 
node making the calculations and correcting its clock accordingly. The two-way 
message exchange to synchronize two nodes A and B works in the following way (see 
Figure 2.5): 
1. Node A sends a message (called synchronization pulse) to B at time Tl . This 
message contains the level number of A and the value of Tl . 
2. Node B receives the message at time T2, where T2 = Tl + S + d, S and d being 
the clock drift between the two nodes, and the propagation delay, respectively. 
3. Node B sends back an acknowledgment to node A at time T3, containing the 
level number of B and the values of Tl , T2 and T3. 
4. Node A receives the acknowledgment at T4. 
Once the acknowledgment is received at node A, it can calculate the clock drift S 
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Node T2 T3 
B 
Figure 2.5: Two-way message exchange, 
and propagation delay d as follows: 
(T2 - Tl) - (T4 - T3) 
5 = 
(T2 - n ) + (T4 - T3) 
This protocol was implemented on Berkeley MICA motes using a 4MHz crystal 
oscillator, after making modifications to the MAC layer so it could timestamp the 
messages at reception time. The accuracy obtained is around 17/xs for the synchro-
nization of two motes. 
2.5.6 Flooding time synchronization protocol (FTSP) 
In [17], Flooding Time Synchronization Protocol (FTSP) is proposed to achieve clock 
synchronization on a wireless sensor network. It uses MAC layer timestamping ca-
pabilities to eliminate several sources of error in the clock synchronization process: 
sending time, access time and receive time. In this protocol, it is assumed that a node, 
the root, which is elected after the exchange of messages in the network, is already 
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synchronized, and the other nodes synchronize with this node. The root broadcasts a 
message which includes the global time at the time of sending the message and root 
ID. The receiver gets a timestamp at the time of reception, and using the arrival and 
sending times, it estimates the clock offset and skew once a number of readings are 
available, using linear regression. 
When a mote determines it is already synchronized, it also broadcasts packets 
which include the global time and root ID, creating in this fashion a clock synchro-
nization hierarchy where the root is at Level 0, nodes within the broadcast range of 
the root at Level 1 and so on. Every node therefore estimates the global time by 
synchronizing its clock to the nodes one level higher than itself. 
This protocol has been implemented in Berkeley MICA2 motes. The average 
accuracy obtained for a 60-node network is 16 fis. 
2.5.7 Lightweight tree-based synchronization (LTS) 
[18] proposes a tree-based synchronization method for sensor networks that requires 
the construction of a spanning tree in order to generate the pair-wise synchroniza-
tions required to synchronize the whole network. It also proposes another method 
to synchronize a multihop network without requiring the construction of a tree, but 
assumes the use of a multi-channel MAC. Both versions were simulated but not im-
plemented, and are aimed at minimizing the complexity of the synchronization and 
not in maximizing accuracy. 
2.5.8 Adaptive clock synchronization 
In [19], RBS is extended to provide an adaptive and probabilistic clock synchroniza-
tion allowing a trade-off between the accuracy achieved and the resources used by 
the protocol. It has not been implemented. 
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2.5.9 Pairwise broadcast synchronization (PBS) 
In [20], a new approach for clock synchronization is proposed. It uses the broadcast 
nature of the wireless channel, and allows a node to synchronize by overhearing syn-
chronization packets exchanged in a similar fashion as TPSN among two neighboring 
nodes, without the need to send extra messages. This method reduces the number of 
messages required for synchronization but requires that all nodes hear each other. A 
multi-cluster extension has been proposed in [21], which requires the construction of 
a hierarchical tree and the use of groupwise pair selection algorithm to achieve global 
synchronization. 
2.5.10 Gradient time synchronization protocol (GTSP) 
The Gradient Time Synchronization Protocol (GTSP) is proposed in [22]. The idea 
of this protocol is to provide a precise clock synchronization between neighboring 
nodes and allow a more loose synchronization between nodes separated by multiple 
hops. The algorithm does not require the construction of a hierarchical topology, or 
a reference node, but in order for it to converge, the network needs to be strongly 
connected. It has been implemented on a small network of 20 Berkeley MICA2 motes, 
obtaining an average error of 4 /is for direct neighbors, and a network-wide average 
error of 14 /xs. 
2.5.11 Average time sync (ATS) 
[23] proposes the Average Time Sync (ATS) to synchronize a multihop wireless sensor 
network. The protocol is formulated as a consensus problem, and achieves global clock 
synchronization to a virtual reference clock in a distributed manner. The protocol 
works by performing three tasks in each of the nodes: relative skew estimation, skew 
compensation and offset compensation. These tasks require only local information 
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exchanges between neighboring nodes, each of the nodes maintains its own estimate 
of the virtual reference clock, which is updated by averaging it with respect to the 
estimate that the neighboring nodes have. It has been implemented on Tmote Sky 
nodes [68]. 
As can be observed from the description of the protocols for clock synchronization 
in wireless sensor networks, with the exception of the last two ( [22,23]), either they 
rely on the construction of a hierarchical tree structure ( [15-18]), which generates 
a lot of overhead and does not support dynamic topology changes very well, or they 
rely on all the nodes sharing the media with a beaconing node ( [14,19,20] ), which 
makes them unsuitable for multihop networks. 
The protocol described in Chapter 4 provides an efficient clock synchronization 
algorithm for wireless multihop networks without requiring the construction of a 
hierarchical structure. It is fully distributed and has been implemented on a Berkeley 
motes testbed with very good results. 
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CHAPTER 3 
BILATERAL CLOCK 
SYNCHRONIZATION 
ALGORITHM 
This chapter presents the bilateral synchronization part of our new clock synchroniza-
tion algorithm. The system model is described in Section 3.1. The method to achieve 
a pair-wise synchronization between neighboring nodes is explained in Section 3.2. 
3.1 System Model 
It is assumed in this work that the clock drift in a node follows the linear equation: 
Ti = otit + Oi, just as in [11,15,17], where % is the local clock, oti and Oi are the drift 
parameters that express the relative speed of the clock and the offset respectively, and 
t is the real time. Nodes' clocks drift at different rates. Neighboring nodes exchange 
timestamps to estimate the best-fit offset line between them by using a recursive least 
squares (RLS) estimation approach. Further details are provided in Section 3.2. 
Also assumed is the fact that all the nodes are aware of the set of neighbor nodes 
with which they can directly communicate, and that the communication links between 
the nodes are bidirectional. 
3.2 Pair-wise Clock Synchronization between 
Neighbors 
In this section we very briefly describe how bilateral synchronization between two 
neighboring nodes is performed. This is not really novel, since it is just a variant of 
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linear regression. 
Suppose we have two nodes i and j which can communicate directly, and want to 
determine their offset Oij and skew a^ by exchanging packets. By the offset Oij(t) 
we will mean the difference in the two clocks Tj(t) — Ti{t). By the skew a^ we will 
mean the ratio of the speeds —. 
At time X(tk), node i sends a packet p(tk) that includes this timestamp, its 
latest estimate of its skew with respect to j , &ji(tk), and its latest estimate of the 
time difference between received and transmitted timestamps for packets from j to i, 
Tji(tk). Packet p(tk) is received at time U(tk) by node j . This is done frequently as 
can shown in Figure 3.1. With these packets, node j can compute the value <%(£&), 
which is the estimate of the skew of j with respect to % at real time tfc. 
Figure 3.1: Frequent transmissions of estimates to neighbor node. 
The value aij(tk) is estimated using Recursive Least Squares (RLS) [69] to solve 
the following problem: 
fc-i 
ay(tfc) = m i n V A ^ - ^ M - ^ - a ^ y - i y f , (3.1) 
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where A G (0,1) is the forgetting or weighting factor that reduces the influence of old 
data. 
The RLS algorithm is widely used in adaptive filtering, system identification and 
adaptive control. It also allows us to estimate a with minimal storage requirements 
since only the previous and current values of U(t) and X(t) are required at any given 
time. 
To develop the algorithm, we rewrite equation (3.1) as follows: 
fc-i 
Ak = minj] A^- ' IT . -^A] 2 , 
/=—oo 
(3.2) 
where 
T, = |£/fe+i)-tf(i,)|, 
<pf = ixc^o-xct,)!, 
A = lal . 
We differentiate (3.2) with respect to A and set it to zero, i.e., 
dA 
k-l 
T A I 2 J2 A*"1"' [T, - <f>fA] 
/=—oo 
= 0, 
and get the following: 
fc-i £ 
/=—oo 
A k-l-l rt - 4>fAk = o, 
where Afc is the least squares estimate. Hence, 
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l=—oo 
Let us define 
fc-i 
/=—oo 
Then we can see that 
Rk = XRk-i + 4>k4>k • 
Substituting (3.4) in (3.3) we get 
fc-i 
Rk-lAk= Y, A*- 1 " '^ , . 
J=—oo 
Similarly, we obtain 
fc 
RkAk+1 = £ Afc-'0,T, 
Z = — o o 
fc-1 
= 2J Afc_1_' 0/Tz + 4>kTk 
l=—oo 
= Rk-iAk + </>fcTfc 
= (i?fc - (/>fc</>fe ) Afc + 0fcTfc. 
Hence, multiplying by R^1, assumed to exist, we obtain 
Afc+1 = (J - i£Vk^JO Afe + i£VkTfc 
= Afc + R^V* (Tfc - <#Afc) • 
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k - i 
E 
Z = — o o 
A fc-i-j <rf A fc-
Now, we need to find a way to calculate Rk in a recursive fashion using only the 
information available at time k. For this, we use the Matrix Inversion Formula [69] 
that says the following: 
If A and B are M x M invertible matrices, D is a N x N matrix, and C 
is a M x N matrix, which are related by 
A = B~l + CD^CF , 
then 
A"1 = B - BC (D + CTBC)_1 CTB, 
whenever the inverses exist. 
We apply this formula to (3.5) using 
D = 1, 
C = (f>k, 
B~ = XRk-i, 
and 
A = Rk, 
and get the following 
R^1 = (AJRfc_1)-1-(Ai?fc_x)-10fc(l + ^(A JR f c_1)-10 f c)"1^(A JR f c_i)"1 
A A (A + ^i?fc-^0fc) ' 
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Now, from (3.6) we see that we need to compute R^cfik, so 
Hk <pk -
A A (A + < ^ ~ - A ) 
R;yfc (A + (fjR-^k) - R^MlRk-Jk 
A(A + ^ ^ 0 f c ) 
A + ^KV*" 
Therefore, we can now compute Afc+1 using values that are all known at time A; 
with the following recursion: 
s
*+> = s ' + i ? S § * ( T ' - « s ' ) 
Once the skew a.ij{tk) is computed, we can estimate the time at which the current 
packet should be received, using a window of AT values of U(tk) and X(tk), by doing 
the following computation: 
1 fc-i 
U(tk) = jj E Iy(*') + *«(**)(*(**)-*(*/))]. (3.7) 
/=fc-JV 
where 
«i(tk) •= Jf^y (3-8) 
Then, we can determine the difference between the received and transmitted times-
tamps at nodes j and i, Ty. This is the sum of the offset of node j with respect to 
i, 0{j, and the transmission delay of the packet, Ay, at time tk. It is estimated by 
subtracting X(tk) from U(tk): 
ry(<*) = Oij(tk) + Ay = U(tk) - X(tk). (3.9) 
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However, we need to first determine the value of A -^ so that we can estimate the 
value of Oij(tk). In order to achieve this, packets must be sent back from node j to 
node i and should include the following values: a^-, Tij(S) and the time S at which 
the packet was sent. Tij(S) is then computed as follows; 
ry(5) = ry(tfc) + (s-Ufa)) ^ - \ (3.10) 
to account for the change in offset between Ufa) and S due to skew. 
Node i executes the same procedure as node j . That is, it also estimates its skew 
with respect to j , dijifa), the time at which the packet should have been received, 
and its difference in time with respect to j , Tjifa). 
Now, node i can estimate the value of the transmission delay as 
Ajtfa) = r ^ + ^ fa) , (3.ii) 
and then its offset with respect to j as 
Ojifa) = r^fa) - Ajifa). (3.12) 
Now, on the next packet, pfa+i), to be sent from node itoj, the values included 
in it would be its most recently calculated skew, a^fa), its most recently calculated 
transmission delay, Ajifa), and the estimated offset at time tk+i, which is given by 
63lfa+1) = O^fa) + (tk+1 - U(S)) a ^ t k l ~ \ (3.13) 
This process is then repeated. 
By this method we can obtain estimates of offsets and skews at given times be-
tween two neighboring nodes. 
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3.3 Simulation Results 
Before implementing the algorithm discussed, simulations were performed to verify if 
the behavior of the algorithm was as expected. 
First, we simulated the pair-wise synchronization procedure with different values 
of A and N (forgetting factor for the RLS algorithm and window size to estimate 
U(i), respectively). We found through simulation with various values of A and N 
that values of A = 0.999 and N = 10 provide the best estimation accuracy without 
requiring too much memory space. 
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Figure 3.2: Skew estimation results obtained in simulation. 
Then, the skew of one of the nodes simulated was modified frequently, within the 
ranges (±100ppm) of the physical oscillator [70] found on the experimental testbed to 
be used, during the course of the simulations in order to determine if the calculations 
of skew and offset adapt to the changes. We can see in Figure 3.2 that the skew 
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estimate indeed adapts to the real skew as it changes. Also, in Figure 3.3 we see that 
the difference between the real and estimated offsets between the two nodes is below 
2 jis. 
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Figure 3.3: Offset estimation results obtained in simulation. 
3.4 Implementation on Berkeley Motes 
For the implementation of the algorithm described in this chapter, as well as the one 
that will be presented in the next chapter, we used a testbed of MICA and MICA2 
motes. 
Figure 3.4, which shows the communication stack of TinyOS on the Berkeley 
motes, provides a better understanding of the sources of error in the clock synchro-
nization process mentioned in Section 2.5.1 and how can we prevent some of them in 
TinyOS. 
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Figure 3.4: Communication stack on TinyOS 1.x. 
• The message to be sent is constructed at the application layer and is then passed 
to the lower layers for its transmission. The time that it takes to construct 
the message and pass it down to the MAC layer is the send time. In Figure 
3.4, it would be time period starting at the point the Clock Synchronization 
application calls sendMsg() (denoted by the symbol .4.), and ending at the 
reception of the message at the RadioCRCPacket component (denoted by the 
symbol B). 
Once in the MAC layer, some time must elapse before the message is actually 
transmitted over the medium, since it has to wait until it has been determined 
that the medium is idle. This is the access time. In Figure 3.4, it would be the 
time period starting at the reception of the message at the RadioCRCPacket 
component (denoted by the symbol B), and ending at the time the first byte is 
sent for transmission to the Radio Module (denoted by the symbol C). 
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• Once the bits have been received at the receiver, the message is reconstructed 
and passed up to the application layer. The time taken to do all this is the 
receive time. In Figure 3.4 it would be time period starting at the reception 
of the first byte at the RadioCRCPacket component from the Radio Module 
(denoted by the symbol Z>), and ending at the time the message is received at 
the Clock Synchronization application (denoted by the symbol £). 
Therefore, in order to reduce the sources of error in our implementation, we have 
modified the MAC layer of TinyOS to allow the timestamping of a packet at the time 
the first byte is sent, instead of doing it at the application layer. We also record the 
time at which the first byte is received by the MAC layer at the receiver side for 
later use by the application layer. In this way, we attempt to mitigate the send time, 
access time and receive time as sources of error, leaving only the propagation time, 
which is negligible in the case of the broadcast medium used in the Berkeley motes. 
3.4.1 Setup 
Sender Receiver 
Figure 3.5: Implementation setup for two nodes. 
For this first stage of testing, three motes were used for the implementation, the 
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sender and receiver as described before, and a third mote connected to a PC through 
the serial port acting as a data collector or gateway. This latter mote continuously 
senses the medium and communicates the data being transmitted to the PC. The 
sender and receiver exchange a clock synchronization message every 30 seconds. This 
setup is illustrated in Figure 3.5. 
In order to get better accuracy, the motes' clocks were modified to generate a finer 
granularity clock, which is triggered by a crystal oscillator. The frequency of such 
crystals was modified in the MICA motes to 500 KHz. For this, the clock timer had 
to be changed since the original timer (Timer 0) uses an 8-bit register to maintain the 
clock counter. This would overflow at this frequency, and so we use instead Timer 1 
which has a 16-bit clock counter. These changes were problematic since Timer 1 is 
already used for other purposes by TinyOS, and the conflicts raised had to be solved 
in order for TinyOS and our application to work correctly. For MICA2 motes, a 
component to use a higher frequency of 921.6 KHz was made available by Maroti et 
al. [71]. 
Although MICA motes were initially used for the implementation of the pair-wise 
synchronization, due to the lack of wireless reprogramming and support in newer 
versions of TinyOS, the subsequent experimentations were only performed on MICA2 
motes. 
3.5 Evaluation 
In order to determine the accuracy of this protocol, the gateway mote periodically 
requests the time each mote has estimated. Both motes reply to this query, one with 
the time it has estimated at the other node, and the other node with its current time. 
The difference between the times replied is the accuracy or error of the protocol. By 
using this method to compare the times in both motes, we remove the send time, 
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Figure 3.6: Accuracy of estimated to real time between 2 neighboring nodes. 
access time, and propagation time as sources of error (see Figure 2.5.1). 
With the implementation on MICA2 motes, we obtained an average accuracy of 
below 2//s (with a worst-case accuracy of 6/is) as can be seen on Figure 3.6. This 
is better than the accuracy obtained in the related works mentioned in Section 2.5, 
with the exception of [17]. It has similar results as ours since we use the same 
timestamping technique to eliminate most of the sources of error that appear when 
we try to synchronize nodes in a network through message exchanges [58]. 
Now that each node is able to estimate the time at each of its neighbors, we want 
all nodes to be able to agree on a common time. In the next chapter we address this 
problem. 
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CHAPTER 4 
MULTIHOP CLOCK 
SYNCHRONIZATION 
We now turn to clock synchronization for a network of clocks. We address the problem 
of how to globally combine bilateral estimates of offset and skew into estimates of 
time with respect to the reference clock for each node in the network. 
Just for simplicity of presentation, suppose that there are n nodes all having 
clocks running at exactly the same speed, except that they have different offsets. 
With node 1 chosen as the reference, let Zi denote the amount that node z's clock is 
ahead of node 1. So z\ = 0. Thus, if U(t) denotes the time at clock i at real time t, 
then 
U(t) = t^t) + zt 
for all t. Let 
be the offset between nodes i and j . 
Let Ni denote the set of neighbors of node i, and |A^| the number of such neighbors. 
Assume that through experimentation as in Section 3.2, we have obtained esti-
mates Xij of Xij = (zi — Zj) for j 6 Ni for all i. These estimates will not be exactly 
equal to the true values. We will also suppose that 
Xji = —x^ for j G Ni for all i, 
so that nodes i and j have talked to each other in arriving at this estimate (using the 
algorithm described in Chapter 3). 
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The problem is this: We want to obtain estimates Vi = 2i of the offsets with 
respect to the reference node. 
4.1 Formulation 
Note that the true x^-'s satisfy the global constraint 
for every cycle 
Z = ( ( « l , i 2 ) , ( « 2 , « 3 ) , - - - , ( * m , « l ) ) 
in the multihop network. 
This is one example of a global constraint that needs to be satisfied by the offset 
between neighboring nodes. There are many such constraints because there are many 
cycles in the graph of the wireless network. 
However, the estimates x^ arrived at through only bilateral transactions described 
in Chapter 3 need not satisfy these constraints. 
By enforcing the large number of such constraints, the estimates {:%} can be 
smoothed and improved. We call this procedure "spatial smoothing." In essence, it 
exploits a spatial law of large numbers through a reformulation of the problem to 
lead to better clock synchronization with respect to any chosen reference node. 
Moreover, we would like to perform such constrained estimation over the ad hoc 
network with the nodes acting in a completely distributed asynchronous manner. 
We will now develop an algorithm where each node only needs to asynchronously 
broadcast a few numbers. Each node updates its numbers through an extremely 
simple formula based on each received broadcast. This then will be shown to lead to 
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an estimate of the offset with respect to any node which acts as a reference node. 
Nodes will not need to know which is the reference node, or the topology of 
the network. No levels of hierarchies of nodes need to be constructed. In fact, our 
protocol exploits all edge offset estimates in the network, and not just those along a 
tree. In a large network it uses all the global information, and yet does so in a simple 
distributed asynchronous manner. Not all local broadcasts have to be received by 
any node either. 
The manner of changing from one reference node to another, i.e., reference clock 
handoff, is also easy. The old reference node simply starts adapting, while the new 
one stops. The rest of the network automatically adapts to this change, and need not 
be explicitly informed of such reference handoffs. 
We illustrate the method with a concrete example. For the network in Figure 4.1, 
there are five nodes { 1 , . . . , 5} and six arcs {(1, 2), (2,3), (3,4), (1,4), (2, 5), (3, 5)}. 
Figure 4.1: Example of a network. 
As a convention we shall take each arc as going from a lower lexicographically num-
bered node to a higher one. Let A be the Node x Arc matrix, called the incidence 
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matrix: 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
(1,2) 
+1 
-1 
0 
0 
0 
(2,3) 
0 
+1 
-1 
0 
0 
(3,4) 
0 
0 
+1 
-1 
0 
(1,4) 
+1 
0 
0 
-1 
0 
(2,5) 
0 
+1 
0 
0 
-1 
(3,5) 
0 
0 
+1 
0 
-1 
where in the row corresponding to node i, we have an entry +1 for all arcs of the 
form (i, *), an entry —1 for all arcs of the form (*, i), and 0 otherwise. 
Let Vi denote the estimate that we will make of Zi. Then the estimate of the offset 
between nodes i and j is Vi — Vj, which is the inner product, {(ij)-th. column of A, 
vector v). Hence, written as a vector of estimates of arc offsets, it is ATv. 
Thus the problem formulation is: 
Mmv\\ATv-x\\2. (4.1) 
Note that this seeks the minimum norm approximation in the range space of 
AT to the vector x. The error of the approximation, by the Projection Theorem, 
is orthogonal to R(AT), the range space of AT. That is, (ATv — x) is orthogonal to 
R(AT). However R(AT)± = N(A), where N(A) is the null space of A. Thus (ATv-x) 
is in the null space of A. Hence the solution of this optimization problem is 
A(ATv-x) = 0, 
or 
AATv = Ax. (4.2). 
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Now let us consider the i-th row of A. It corresponds to node i. It has a ±1 for every 
incident arc. Now the j'-th column of AT similarly has ±1 for every arc incident to j . 
Hence (AAT)a = # of neighbors of i = \Ni\. Also, 
(AA^j = -ItijeNi 
= Oif j^ iV, . 
Thus the i-th entry of AATv is 
\Ni\Vi ~ Yl V3-
Also, the i-th. entry of Ax is the sum of terms of the form +1 times £;*, or (—1) times 
x*i, which in either case is x^. Thus the i-th entry of Ax is 
E 
jeNi 
Xij. 
Thus (4.2) can be written as: 
\Ni\vi — 2_. vj = / J %ij f° r a u i- (4-3) 
Note that this is deficient by at least one rank. So we set 
vi := 0. 
This corresponds to choosing node 1 as the reference node. 
We will now consider the problem: 
M i n ^ ^ M i V i K - ^ ^ - ^ ^ j . (4.4) 
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We will solve the problem by coordinate descent since that will provide a fully 
distributed algorithm, in addition to being asynchronous. At the m-th iterate, let 
v(m) be the estimate. We can take the initial iterate as 
v(0) := 0. 
Also, since node 1 is the reference, we also have 
i>i(m) := 0 for all m > 0. 
We will minimize over Vi(k) perturbing it by Si to minimize the objective function 
(4.4), while keeping Vj(k) invariant for j ^ i. Now the only terms in which vi figures 
in (4.4) are 
V j€Ni jeNi J 
I 
jeNi 
\ 
\Ni\v3 -^2vk~Yl Aik ~Vi~ x j * 
V k^i kjti 
When we perturb Vi to Vi + <5j, we get 
[iNiKvi + SJ-^Vj + Xij)) + 
\ jeNi ) 
X \Nj\V3 ~ Yl(Vk+ ^ -(vi + $i)- %ji 
) jeNi \ 
keNj 
k^i 
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Differentiating with respect to Si, and setting to 0 gives, 
WllNiUvi + S^-^ivj+Xij) 
jeNi 
jeNi JegJVj 
Let 
Then 
So 
ej : = \Nj\vj- J2(vk + Xjk) 
k<ENj 
— "Reported error of node j " . 
({N^ + lNiDSi + lNilei-Y,^ = 0. 
jeNt 
Si = 
t-ujeN^J \^i\ei 
IW + M 
1 
NA + 1 jeNi 
So the distributed algorithm is very simple: At each iterate, some node, say node i, 
changes its Vi to Vi + Si, where 
Si := 
1 
\Nt\ + l 
1 
reE*6'-*) 
jeNi 
\Ni 
- [Average of (e,- — ej) reported by its neighbors j] 
i\ T 1 
Thus, sporadically, each node i broadcasts to its neighbors (i,Vi,e{). From this each 
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node can calculate: 
ej = Wjlvj-^ivi + Xji). 
i<=Nj 
It then adjusts its Vj to Vj + 5j. Then it rebroadcasts e_,-, etc. • 
Now, if the clocks do not run at the same speed, that is, they have a drift or 
skew, a similar process would also have to be executed simultaneously to estimate 
the clocks' skews. If we substitute log(aji) for Xji we are able to use the same solution 
just discussed to estimate skews while taking global constraints into account. 
Also, due to the difference in skews between the nodes' clocks, every time the 
error is computed by a node i for the offset estimation, the u,'s and Xjk's of all its 
neighboring nodes k should be adjusted using the latest estimation of their skew in 
a way similar to the one shown in equation 3.13. 
One can also obtain an alternative algorithm for the problem of minimizing (4.1). 
If we take another look at the original problem formulation in (4.1), we see that since 
we are trying to minimize v, we can simply use the following recursion: 
Vi = —-—-— J— for all i. (4.5) 
Therefore we have another distributed algorithm which is even simpler. Each node 
j simply broadcasts to its neighbors (j,Vj) sporadically, and from this, each node i 
can calculate its Vi following (4.5). 
A further modification is to only take the average in (4.5) with respect to nodes 
that are at a fewer number of hops in distance from the reference node. 
In [72], Giridhar and Kumar have analyzed the least-squares approach used in 
this protocol by relating the optimization problem given by (4.1), to the problem 
of determining the electrical resistance between two nodes in an electrical network 
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(in a similar way that Karp et al. did in [73] for RBS). They have shown that the 
performance of the least-squares algorithm, measured in terms of maximum error 
variance, is substantially better than that of a tree-based approach like TPSN, and 
also provide the lower and upper bounds on the settling time of the distributed 
algorithm we have just described. 
4.2 Implementation on Berkeley Motes 
The algorithm represented by (4.5) was implemented using MICA2 motes on a 40-
node network where different topologies were enforced by software. That is, although 
all nodes operated on the same cell, packets were filtered out according to the multi-
hop topology desired, i.e., as in MAC filtering. 
4.2.1 Setup 
As with the implementation of the pair-wise synchronization algorithm, we had a mote 
acting as a gateway to the PC that continuously collected the packets transmitted 
by the motes in the network. Each node sends a clock synchronization message to 
its neighbors, with a time interval randomly selected between 25 and 45 seconds so 
as to reduce the probability of collisions. The gateway mote requests the reference 
time each mote has estimated, every 15 seconds. To avoid collisions and errors in the 
measurements, instead of each mote responding to the queries made by the gateway 
mote immediately, they store the information regarding their estimates of the time 
at the reference, at the time each query is received on the external 512 KBytes flash 
EEPROM. The complete information was collected once the experiment was finished, 
so we could determine the accuracy of the algorithm by comparing the estimate the 
reference mote had made at each of the queries, which are identified using a sequence 
number, with the estimate that each of the other motes had at that same query. 
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Figure 4.2: Link topology for the multihop implementation. 
4.3 Evaluation 
For the topology of 4x10 motes shown in Figure 4.2, which results in a maximum 
9-hop network, we show the minimum, maximum and average accuracy obtained 
between the estimated time and the actual time at the reference across the whole 
network in Figure 4.3. The variant shown is that where the averaging is done over 
neighbors at a fewer number of hops from the reference node. 
Such results are quite similar to the ones reported for FTSP in [17]. So taking 
into account that leading research groups on sensor networks, such as the ones in the 
University of Virginia and Ohio State, use FTSP, we set to comparing the behavior 
of this algorithm with FTSP, by running it on the exact same topology. FTSP nodes 
send clock synchronization messages every 30 seconds, and our gateway mote queries 
the global time that every mote has estimated every 15 seconds. 
The minimum, maximum and average accuracy obtained between the estimated 
time and the actual time at the reference across the whole network through FTSP 
are shown in Figure 4.4. 
Also plotted in Figure 4.5 is the behavior of the average accuracy as well as the 
standard deviation for each of the 9 hops in the network. We can observe that our 
algorithm provides better accuracy, and the estimates have smaller standard devia-
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Figure 4.4: Experimental results of FTSP on the 40-node network. 
tion, than the estimates obtained using FTSP in the same network. The statistics 
were computed starting at query 100 so they are not affected by the initial state, 
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Figure 4.5: Comparison to FTSP. 
which cannot be compared exactly since our algorithm starts with the reference node 
already determined, while FTSP goes through an election process to determine what 
node is the reference, i.e., the node with smaller ID. 
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CHAPTER 5 
SECURITY AND CLOCK 
SYNCHRONIZATION 
In the previous chapter we presented a completely distributed and asynchronous 
algorithm to achieve clock synchronization, where nodes communicate only with their 
neighboring nodes, and which gives a better performance in terms of accuracy and 
error variance when compared with a widely used protocol such as FTSP. However, 
like the other protocols mentioned in Section 2.5, it assumes a benign environment, 
that is, all nodes are cooperative and trustworthy. 
It has been noted in Chapter 2 that clock synchronization is, in fact, a critical 
service in many distributed applications. In an adversarial environment, its function-
ality could be adversely affected by attackers, which would ultimately render the clock 
synchronization service useless. For instance, a malicious node could get control of a 
link between two nodes and change the characteristics of the link, causing the nodes 
to obtain faulty time estimates. This would then prevent the application using the 
clock synchronization from working as it should, e.g., objects would not be tracked or 
localized correctly, highway traffic would not be estimated adequately, etc. Therefore, 
there is a need to develop protocols to provide a secure clock synchronization capable 
of running in hostile environments and detecting the presence of attackers. In the 
next two chapters, we present our work on secure clock synchronization. We first 
present the results for a single link, and then on a network-wide scale. We begin by 
discussing in this chapter some required background to better understand the attacks 
that can be inflicted on a wireless sensor network, and how can we develop defenses 
against such attacks. 
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5.1 Requirements for Sensor Network Security 
In order to prevent most of the attacks, a wireless sensor network should be designed 
to meet the following requirements [74]: 
1. Data confidentiality. A node should keep sensitive data secret. 
2. Data authentication. A node should be able to verify that a received message 
was actually sent by the claimed sender. 
3. Data integrity. A node should be able to detect alterations in the received 
messages. 
4. Data freshness. A node should be able to determine if a received message is 
recent, and not a replayed one. 
To achieve data confidentiality, the standard approach is to use cryptographic 
techniques which could be symmetric (DES, RC5, or AES), or asymmetric (RSA, 
ECC) [75]. Data authentication is achieved by computing a message integrity code 
(MIC) using a private key (again, cryptography of some kind is involved) [76]. Data 
integrity can be achieved through data authentication. Data freshness is achieved by 
inserting a nonce (randomly generated value) or another time-related counter in the 
messages [77]. 
5.2 Attacks 
There are several possible attacks on a wireless sensor network, which could be cate-
gorized as follows [78]: 
1. Eavesdropping. The attacker seeks to determine what is the information being 
exchanged in the network. The attack could be passive, meaning that the 
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eavesdropper only listens to the messages, or active, meaning the eavesdropper 
sends queries in order to elicit further message exchanges. 
2. Disruption. The attacker seeks to stop the application from working correctly. 
It does this by injecting messages, corrupting data, or by directly manipulating 
the environment. 
Specific types of attacks include [79]: 
• Denial of service attack. Its goal is to make a service unavailable to the clients. 
It could be performed by jamming, which is the transmission of a signal that 
interferes with the radio frequencies used by the radio [80], by violating the 
communication protocol at the link layer level, by refusing to route messages, 
or by flooding. 
• Sybil attack. This is defined as a "malicious device illegitimately taking on 
multiple identities" [81]. This is an effective attack against routing algorithms, 
data aggregation, voting and fair resource allocation. 
• Node replication attack. An attacker adds a node to an existing sensor network 
by replicating the node ID of an existing sensor node [82] leading to a disruption 
of the performance of the network. 
• Attacks against privacy. Sensitive information could be discovered by the at-
tacker by means of eavesdropping or traffic analysis [83]. 
• Wormhole attack. In this attack, the attacker receives a message at one location 
in the network, tunnels it to another location and replays it at the second 
location, introducing links that do not have the properties of the network (i.e., 
lower delay, higher bandwidth) [84]. 
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• Man-in-the-middle attack. In this attack, the attacker intercepts messages ex-
changed between two nodes and relays such messages in a way that makes the 
two nodes believe the link they share is valid, while in reality the characteristics 
of the link have been modified [1]. 
• Physical attack. When deployed in hostile outdoor environments, given that 
the sensors are small, unattended and distributed, physical attacks resulting in 
physical damages to the node are highly likely [85,86]. 
5.3 Defenses 
Cryptography is the standard defense against eavesdropping, injection and corruption 
of messages. The different cryptographic methods require the establishment of a 
key (or keys) among the nodes in the network so they can perform the necessary 
operations to encrypt, decrypt or authenticate the messages exchanged. Symmetric 
key cryptography uses the same key to encrypt and decrypt a message. Asymmetric 
or public key cryptography uses different keys for encryption and decryption and 
provides for a simpler way to achieve message authentication. While symmetric key 
cryptography requires less computation resources, it involves a more complicated key 
distribution scheme. 
In terms of cryptography and key distribution, some of the most important pro-
tocols developed are: 
• TinySEC [87] is the first fully-implemented link layer security architecture for 
wireless sensor networks. Its goal is to guarantee data confidentiality, data 
authentication and data integrity. It was implemented under TinyOS. Its choice 
of block cipher is Skipjack, which the authors found to be the most suitable for 
the hardware available at the time (MICA2). TinySEC always authenticates 
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messages, and for this, it uses CBC-MAC to compute and verify the MICs. It 
relies on a single network-wide key, which is its main drawback. 
• yuTESLA [74] offers an asymmetric cryptographic type of broadcast data au-
thentication using symmetric keys. The basic idea is to divide the time into 
intervals of equal duration and use a different key to compute the MICs in each 
interval. The disclosure of the key used in a given interval is delayed to a later 
interval. It requires the nodes to be loosely clock synchronized. 
• LEAP [88] (Localized Encryption and Authentication Protocol) is a key man-
agement protocol for sensor networks. It supports four types of keys for each 
sensor, which the authors claim are adequate for all types of communications in 
sensor networks. Sensors are preloaded with an initial key from which further 
keys can be established. 
• PIKE [89] is a protocol to establish a key between two sensors using as a trusted 
intermediary a third node located somewhere within the sensor network. 
• Probabilistic key pre-deployment scheme [90] consists of three phases: key pre-
distribution, shared-key discovery, and path-key establishment. In this work 
it is shown that when nodes randomly draw and store a small number of keys 
from a large pool, there is a considerably large probability that two neighboring 
nodes will have a shared key. 
For attacks such as denial of service, node replication, Sybil, and wormhole at-
tacks, several defenses have been proposed: 
• For jamming at the physical layer, the standard defense involves various forms 
of spread-spectrum communication [77]. To handle jamming at the MAC layer, 
Wood and Stankovic [80] propose the utilization of a MAC admission control 
that is rate limiting. 
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• For node replication attacks and Sybil attacks, Newsome et al. [81] propose 
several defenses including wireless network testing, key space verification, and 
central node registration. 
• For wormhole attacks, Hu et al. [84] propose two different types of defenses, 
geographic leashes, which use location information, and temporal leashes, which 
use timestamps, in order to constrain wormholes to a small region. In [91], 
Eriksson et al. propose a timing based defense called TrueLink. It does not rely 
on precise clock synchronization, and uses a modified medium access protocol. 
It is meant to be used together with a secure routing protocol. 
5.4 Secure Clock Synchronization 
Regarding clock synchronization, there are studies [92,93] describing possible attacks 
that could be performed on some of the clock synchronization protocols mentioned 
in Section 2.5. They can be summarized as follows: 
• For RBS, a compromised node could send falsified synchronization information 
to its neighbor during the exchange period leading to an incorrect estimation 
of the phase and skew by the honest node. 
• For TPSN, a compromised node can affect its children by sending them incorrect 
timestamps, or it could also lie about its level in the tree. 
• For FTSP, a compromised node could claim to be the root node with ID 0 
and begin with a higher sequence number than the actual root node making all 
nodes disregard the updates sent by the actual root node. 
Very few secure clock synchronization algorithms have been proposed as defense 
against these attacks. 
53 
5.4.1 SPS and SGS 
In [94], using TPSN as a base, Ganeriwal et al. propose the Secure Pairwise Synchro-
nization (SPS) protocol to handle a pulse-delay attack, where an attacker delays the 
time at which a synchronization packet is received, modifying the offset and delay 
calculation performed at the receiver (Section 2.5.5 shows how these calculations are 
made). SPS provides authentication to MAC layer timestamping by adding a times-
tamp and message integrity code (MIC) as the message is being transmitted, which 
works only for sensors with low data rates such as MICA2, but not with higher data 
rates as the ones present in more recent sensors such as the IMote2. SGS (Secure 
Group Synchronization) uses SPS to synchronize a group of nodes, and assumes all 
nodes are within range. 
5.4.2 Secure and resilient clock synchronization 
In [95], Sun et al. propose two statistical techniques for secure and resilient clock syn-
chronization. The level-based clock synchronization technique is targeted at static 
sensors, and constructs a tree hierarchy where clock synchronization messages flow 
from the root to the leaves. The diffusion-based clock synchronization allows sen-
sor nodes to synchronize to the common source through any neighbor nodes without 
requiring any hierarchal structure. The goal of both techniques is to provide fault-
tolerance up to a specific number of malicious nodes, but they are not able to handle 
pulse-delay and wormhole attacks since they have no way to authenticate the time-
liness of the synchronization messages. The techniques were improved in [96], and a 
new approach called TinySeRSync emerged, using authenticated MAC layer times-
tamping for a single hop synchronization, and ^TESLA local broadcast authentication 
protocol for global synchronization. 
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CHAPTER 6 
SECURE CLOCK 
SYNCHRONIZATION OVER A 
SINGLE LINK 
We will now present a secure clock synchronization protocol that is able to detect man-
in-the-middle attacks using only timing information under appropriate conditions. 
We begin with a thorough theoretical description of the protocol [1], followed by a 
description of the implementation that has been performed using IMote2 motes and 
TinyOS 2.1, as well as the results of our experimental evaluation. 
6.1 Protocol Description 
6.1.1 Notation 
Throughout this chapter we will be using the following notation 
• TA denotes the turn-around time of node A, which is the context switch time 
taken by a radio transceiver to switch from transmitting to receiving, or vice-
versa 
•
 mABn denotes the delay induced by attacker on the n-th packet from A to B 
• OA denotes the clock offset of node A, relative to a reference or master clock t 
• SA denotes the clock skew of node A, relative to a reference or master clock t 
• SAB denotes the relative clock skew of node B with respect to node A, SAB = 
SB/SA 
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• 5AB denotes the one-way delay from A to B, which includes only the propaga-
tion delay between nodes A and B 
• r denotes the round-trip time, which is the sum of 5AB and 5BA 
• r' denotes the sum of the round-trip time r and the delay induced by the attacker 
in both directions 
• PAB{TI) denotes the local clock time at node B when the n-th packet from A is 
received 
• VAB{n) denotes the local clock time at node A's when it sends its n-th packet 
t o B 
• PAB{I^) denotes the n-th packet sent from A to B 
6.1.2 Assumptions 
• Clocks are affine. An affine clock is one where the local time at node A has the 
value 
A(t) = SAt + oA , 
where 
t is the time at some master clock, 
SA > 0, denotes the clock skew, which is the relative speed of the clock at node 
A with respect to the master clock, and 
OA denotes the offset of node A with respect to the master clock. 
• Nodes can accurately timestamp packets, which, as we saw in Section 3.4, is 
possible for MICA2 motes. In Section 6.2.2, we will see how this is possible in 
IMote2 motes. 
• If two nodes can communicate directly we say they share a link. 
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• Both endpoints of a link are half-duplex nodes, meaning they can only receive 
or transmit, but not both concurrently. In this case rA is the time to switch 
from transmit to receive, or vice-versa. 
• Nodes sharing a link share a private key, which is used to provide authentication 
and confidentiality. Using the private keys in this way eliminates traditional, 
cryptographic man-in-the-middle attacks. Thus, nodes exchange unpredictable 
and verifiable messages. A number of techniques exist for deriving the private 
key [97]. 
• The attacker can be either half-duplex, as the endpoints are, or full duplex, 
meaning it has the ability to transmit and receive concurrently. 
• If the attacker is half-duplex, then the attacker's radio has a negligible turn-
around time, meaning it can switch from receiving to transmitting or vice-versa 
practically immediately, with zero context switch time. 
• The attacker is unable to break the cryptography used in the protocol. 
• The attacker is free to do as it pleases, but desires to remain undetected. 
• The attacker is free to use additional hardware such as directional antennas, 
emissions detection hardware, etc. 
6.1.3 Basic clock synchronization protocol 
The basic clock synchronization for two nodes A and B, is achieved by exchanging 
4 packets as shown in Figure 6.1. PAB(P) denotes the n-th packet sent from node A 
to B and includes the time at which it is sent, aAB(n), as well as the last time at 
which a packet was received in the reverse path, PAB{^ — !)• Once these 4 packets 
have been exchanged, node A has enough information to estimate the relative skew 
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of B with respect to A, SAB, as well as the one-way delay from A to B, SAB, using 
the following equations: 
SAB = 
pABJn) - pABJn - 1) 
<7AB(n) -OAB^JI- \)'' (6.1) 
SAB = PAB(n) - SAB°AB(n). (6.2) 
Once another packet is sent from A to B, PAB{3), B is able to make similar 
measurements in the reverse path. 
SB A 
I 1 
PAB(1) crBA{l) 
TB 
I 1 
PABV) <TBA(2) 
i 1 SAB 
PBAW TAB (2) 
i 1 SAB 
PBA(2) 
Figure 6.1: Message exchanges to achieve basic clock synchronization 
Freris and Kumar [50] show that after the completion of this basic clock synchro-
nization, legitimate nodes can exactly predict the time at which the packet P(n + 1) 
will be received according to the receiving node's clock by using the following predic-
tion equation: 
PAB(II + 1) = SAB<?AB{n + 1) + SAB- (6.3) 
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6.1.4 Adding security to the protocol 
By using the basic clock synchronization protocol in the previous section, legitimate 
nodes are able to impose restrictions on the kind of additional relaying delays a man-
in-the-middle attacker can impose on the packets exchanged between them. These 
restrictions are described in the following theorem. 
Theorem 6.1.1. If two nodes having affine clocks use a fixed network where the delay 
between the nodes is constant, and are able to authenticate packets sent by each other, 
then any attacker that delays packets by an amount of time that is not constant, can 
be eventually detected using timing information alone. 
Intuition: We will refer to the time given by the sender's clock at the time at which it 
begins transmitting a packet (refer to Figure 2.3 on page 13) as the sender timestamp, 
and the time according to the receiver's clock at which it begins receiving the packet 
as the receiver timestamp. In the absence of an attacker, the receiver timestamps 
for messages in a node B are affine in the sender timestamps by node A at the 
transmission of such messages. Thus, if an attacker M wants to remain undetected, 
the delay m^Bi it induces in message i must still result in a reception timestamp 
affine in the sending timestamp. Node B can calculate its relative skew with respect 
to A, SBA, using these timestamps. If the calculated skew is lower than the actual 
skew then the delay the attacker M induces is decreasing, and once this induced delay 
reaches zero, the attacker M will be detected since it cannot relay a message before 
receiving it, i.e., it cannot induce negative delays. If we also use the fact that the 
product of skews in both directions must be 1 (SABSBA=1), then M is not able to 
increase the induced delay in either direction without being detected. Therefore, M 
can impose only a constant delay that is the same for all packets if it wants to remain 
undetected. 
Proof. Let oi, a 2 , . . . , a^ be the transmission times of packets sent by A to B, and 
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&i, &2,..., bk be the transmission times of packets sent from B to A. All transmis-
sion times are according to the master clock t. Let us define 5AB to be the normal 
(constant) delay from A to B, and mABi to be the delay the attacker additionally 
imposes on the ith packet from A to B. Let us also define the affine transformation 
functions A(t) = SAt + oA and B(t) = SBt + oB that receive the time from the master 
clock t as input, and return the time as measured by nodes A and B, respectively. 
Node B calculates the difference between the send and receive timestamps of 
packet i as 
di = B(a,i + 5AB + mABi) - A(a,i). 
If we use the expansion B{di + 5AB + m>ABi) = B(a,i) + SB{$AB + mABi), and then 
we add and subtract SABA(a,i), we get 
di = SABA(ai) - A(at) + B{at) - SABA{ai) + SB(SAB + mABi). 
This can be simplified using 
B(di) - SABA(cii) = (SBa,i + oB) - {SBdi + SABoA) 
— oB — SABoA , 
to get 
di = (SAB - l)A(ai) + SBmABi + oB - SABoA + SB5AB . 
Note that in the absence of the attacker, i.e., when mABi = 0, then di is affine in 
dj. Hence, for the attacker M to remain undetected, it must choose a mABi such that 
di continues to remain affine in a*. 
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From any two di, dj (i ^ j) and the corresponding send timestamps, A(ai),A(a,j), 
B calculates its perceived skew relative to A using 
AB
 ~ A{aj) - A(ai) ' 
Given that m ^ is affine, it must be either a constant, increasing, or decreasing func-
tion of A(a,i). When mABi is increasing, S'AB > SAB, and when rriABi is decreasing, 
SAB < SAB • 
In case rriABi is decreasing, after a large enough finite time, the affine delay rriABi 
will become negative, mABi < 0, at which point the attacker would be caught due 
to violating causality. This forces the attacker to choose SAB > SAB to remain 
undetected. A similar argument for packets sent from B to A shows that for the 
attacker to remain undetected, it must also choose S'BA > SBA- Then, for the attacker 
to remain undetected it must choose S'ABS'BA > SABSBA = 1, but when S'ABS'BA ^ 1, 
nodes can detect an attack since they can exchange their skew estimates and check to 
see if their product deviates from 1. Therefore, the only option left for the attacker, 
so it can remain undetected, is to choose SAB — SAB, which implies that m ^ is 
constant. • 
Therefore, to secure the basic clock synchronization protocol of Section 6.1.3, once 
nodes A and B are synchronized: 
1. the sender A includes the estimation of the time at which the packet n + 1 will 
be received, PAB^ + 1)> calculated using (6.3), 
2. the sender A appends a Message Integrity Code (MIC) to the packet contents, 
which is calculated using a private key shared with the receiver, 
3. the receiver B authenticates the packet contents, 
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4. the receiver B calculates the skew and delay using (6.1) and (6.2), and deter-
mines if the delay is consistent with prior delays. If not, the attacker is instantly 
detected. 
If the man-in-the-middle attacker is able to induce only a constant delay, we can 
still detect it using only timing information under certain conditions which we now 
describe in the sequel. 
To reduce the possibility of cryptographic attacks, a neighbor discovery subpro-
tocol is used. 
Detection of a half-duplex attacker 
As previously mentioned, a half-duplex attacker is able to transmit or receive messages 
but not perform both concurrently. To detect such an attacker, we can take advantage 
of this limitation on concurrency. The protocol could send messages long enough for 
the attacker to not be able to delay all messages by a constant time, violating the 
synchronization requirements described above, and allowing its detection. 
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Figure 6.2: Detecting a half-duplex attacker. Source: [1] 
To illustrate this protocol, we use Figure 6.2. We assume that node A synchronizes 
with node B, that the round-trip time is measured as r when there is no man-in-
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the-middle attacker present, and that when a man-in-the-middle attacker becomes 
present between A and B, the round-trip time is measured as r'. As long as the delay 
induced by the attacker, r' — r is a non-negative constant delay, the attacker remains 
undetected, by Theorem 6.1.1. 
Once nodes A and B are synchronized, node A registers the current time in its 
clock, tA, and sends a timestamped message PAB{TI) of duration 
P>\(r' + rB), (6.4) 
where TB is the turnaround time of node B. On reception of this message, node B 
switches from receiving to transmitting mode, and begins sending a timestamped 
message PBA(P) of the same duration (5 to node A. 
Once node A receives the completes message PBA{n), it calculates the elapsed 
time, Teiapseci, from when it began the transmission of message PAB(P) to the com-
pletion of reception of message PBA(n), which is expected to be 
Telapsed = f + TB + 2fi . 
However, from (6.4), r' + rB < 2/5, and therefore, 
Telapsed = r' + TB + 2p<4p. 
This leads to the following lemma. 
Lemma 6.1.2. The above detection protocol is able to detect a half-duplex man-in-
the-middle attacker. 
Proof. Given that the attacker is half-duplex, it cannot transmit and receive con-
currently. Therefore, the attacker requires at least 4 times the message transmission 
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duration, /5, so that it will be able to buffer, delay, and forward both messages PAB(^ ) 
and PBA{I^)- This amount of time is required by the the attacker since it cannot pre-
dict when the messages PAB{I^) and PBA(JI) w m De sent. This will result in an elapsed 
time T'elapsed > 4/?, which exceeds the time expected by node A, Telapsed. Therefore 
the attacker is detected. • 
6.2 Implementation 
The protocols above described have been implemented on a testbed comprised of 
Crossbow's IMote2 sensor nodes [65], which include Zigbee compliant CC2420 radios 
capable of transmitting at a rate of 250 kbps [98]. The implementation is built on 
top of TinyOS 2.1 [60]. The first goal of the implementation is to determine whether 
the assumptions and properties of the theoretical results found in [1] do in fact hold 
in practice. This includes several verifications: 
i) That practical clock drift will in fact show enough stability that delays can be 
estimated with reasonable accuracy. 
ii) The accuracy in estimating delays in the absence of an attacker is sufficient that 
the product of the estimates of SAB and SBA is close to 1 to within a desirable 
accuracy. 
iii) The scheme for catching a half-duplex attacker works for practical turnaround 
times. 
The implementation consists of three major parts: 
1. Exponential smoothing. It allows us to handle variability in the timestamps. 
2. MAC layer timestamping. It allows to timestamp a packet at the actual time 
the radio begins its transmission or reception. See Figure 2.3. 
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3. Neighbor discovery subprotocol. It allows the nodes to detect replayed packets. 
6.2.1 Exponential smoothing 
Exponential smoothing is a linear regression procedure which assigns exponentially 
decreasing weights to the data being collected, as it becomes older. It helps us to 
handle the variability in the timestamps, which is the data we are collecting. We 
use exponential smoothing to estimate the clock skew, the one-way delay, and the 
predicted time at which a receiving node will receive a packet, as follows. 
The estimate of the skew of B with respect to A, which is the ratio of the speed 
of the clock at B to the speed of the clock at A, made by A after the N-th packet 
from B to A is received, is estimated as 
y^N N-n PAB{n)-pABJn-l) 
q / . « _ Z^n=2 / <TAB(n)-aAB(n-l) (R r\ 
SAB(N) , (6.5) 
Ljn=2 I 
where 0 < 7 < 1 is the exponential forgetting or smoothing factor, which in our 
implementation is assigned a value of 0.99, after the simulation results discussed in 
Section 3.3. The hat-notation indicates that the quantity under the hat is an estimate. 
As mentioned in Section 6.1.1, PAB(^) denotes the time on B's clock at the time at 
which the n-th packet from A arrived, and crAB(TI) denotes the time on A's clock 
when A sends its n-th packet to B. 
The one-way delay from node A to node B is estimated as 
Sr^N PAB{n)-SAB{n-l)uAB{n) N-n 
The time at which the n-th packet sent by node A will be received by node B, 
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according to the clock at node B, is estimated as (see (6.3)) 
pAB(n) = SAB(n - l)[aAB(n) + SAB(n - 1)]. (6.6) 
Node B will similarly use exponential smoothing to arrive at the estimate of the 
skew in the other direction SBA(N), the estimate of the one-way delay 6BA, and the 
prediction of the time at which node A will receive the n-th packet sent by node B, 
according to node A's clock, PBA{^)-
Now, if we were to use these equations as shown, the implementation would have 
to store all the collected timestamps, which is not suitable for a sensor with limited 
memory. However, we can apply the procedure described in Section 3.2 to derive 
a recursive method to calculate the smoothed estimates. By doing this, we only 
need to store the last timestamp obtained and the previous estimate value in our 
implementation. 
6.2.2 MAC layer timestamping 
In order to eliminate the variable processing delay in the network stack in our calcu-
lations, we have modified the MAC layer of TinyOS 2.1 to allow the timestamping 
of a packet at the time the first byte is sent, instead of doing it at the application 
layer; see Figure 2.3. We also record the time at which the first byte is received by 
the MAC layer at the receiver side for later use by the application layer, see Figure 
2.3 again, in a way similar to what is described in Section 3.4. 
To implement this in the new ChipCon CC2420 radio module found in the IMote2 
sensor node, we use the ideas provided at the TEP 132 [99] and its reference implemen-
tation. The reference implementation timestamps packet transmission and reception 
in an Atmel RF230 transceiver using a 32KHz timer, but since we need microsecond 
resolution, we had to make the following changes in the TinyOS structure: 
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• a new module to provide a microsecond counter was built, 
• the General Purpose I/O handler in charge of signaling the SFD interrupt was 
modified to use our microsecond counter instead of the 32KHz counter, and 
• the CC2420 modules in charge of packet transmission and reception were mod-
ified to use our microsecond counter instead of the 32KHz counter. 
The changes were carefully made so as to avoid disrupting other modules or applica-
tions in TinyOS. 
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Figure 6.3: Illustration of MAC layer timestamping in the CC2420 radio. 
The following process is illustrated in Figure 6.3. In the CC2420 [98], which is 
a packet radio (unlike the CC1000 byte radio found in MICA2), we need to place 
the message to transmit in the TX buffer prior to transmission; and once a packet 
is received, we read the contents from the RX buffer. Transmission begins with a 
preamble, which is used for radio calibration, followed by a Start Frame Delimiter 
(SFD). On the sending side, once this SFD is sent, and on the receiving side, once the 
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SFD is received, the SFD pin in the CC2420 radio goes active, which in turn triggers an 
interrupt in the IMote2. By modifying the corresponding interrupt service handler, 
we can either 
• record the current time with the metadata associated with the packet on the 
receiving side, so that the upper layers are aware of the time at which the packet 
was received, or 
• directly modify the TX buffer to insert the current timestamp in the packet 
that is currently being transmitted. 
The idealized protocol described in Section 6.1.4, which inserts an estimated time 
of arrival (ETA) in each packet as calculated using (6.3), as well as an authenticator 
for the packet contents using a cryptographic scheme such as AES [100], cannot be 
achieved in our implementation. The reason is that we are timestamping the packets 
being sent at real time during transmission, and it takes 830 /is for the IMote2 to 
compute a floating-point multiplication and 4650 /us to compute an AES encryption, 
for instance. We therefore modified the way the ETA is calculated and the way the 
authentication is performed. In the case of the ETA, it is now performed by the 
destination, taking advantage of the fact that the information required for such task, 
i.e., skew and one-way delay estimates, are already included in the packet since they 
are necessary for the verification of skew consistency. As for the authentication, we 
decided on including the authenticator for the current packet being sent in the next 
packet. This approach has the drawbacks of increasing packet loss probability and 
latency, but we are now able to timestamp the packets in the way we need it. 
6.2.3 Neighbor discovery subprotocol 
We include a neighbor discovery subprotocol to make sure that an attacker cannot re-
play packets between sessions by ensuring the freshness of each clock synchronization 
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packet. Otherwise an attacker could replay old synchronization packets and make a 
node believe that a good link is not behaving correctly. 
We assume that when two nodes A and B share a link, they also share a secret 
key, referred to as the master key. There are several schemes to obtain this master 
key: key pre-distribution schemes, pairwise key establishment, public key schemes, 
among others [97]. Instead of using the master key to perform the cryptographic 
operations, our protocols use a session key throughout a single session. A session 
starts when the neighbor discovery subprotocol is executed, and it ends when the two 
nodes stop being in each other's range or when the packet number space is exhausted 
in either direction. In the latter case, the neighbor discovery subprotocol is run again 
to establish a new session key. 
To create a session, when node A believes that node B is its neighbor, the following 
exchange of packets takes place: 
A —> B: INITIATE, A, B, rjA, MIC(packet)icAS 
A sends an INITIATE packet to B which contains the addresses of A, B, a 
nonce TJA, and an authenticator calculated using the master key KAB-
B —> A: RESPOND, B, A, r)A, r}B, MIC(packet)^B 
B generates its own nonce r\B to ensure that r\A corresponds to a fresh request 
from A, and sends A a RESPOND packet which contains the addresses of B, A, the 
nonce T]A, the nonce rjB, and an authenticator calculated using the master key KAB-
A -* B: ACCEPT, A, B, r)A, rjB, MIC(packe t ) K m n , 
If the RESPOND packet is received as a timely response to its INITIATE packet, 
it knows that r]B is fresh (because it is tied to r]A, so the pair {r)A,r}B) corresponds 
to a fresh session). A then generates the session key Ksessi(m=lii(r)A\\'riB\\KAB) and 
returns an ACCEPT packet containing A and B's addresses, both nonces r)A and rjB, 
and an authenticator calculated using the new session key Ksession. 
If B receives the ACCEPT packet as a timely response to its RESPOND packet, 
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it knows that TJA is fresh (because it is tied to r}B, so the pair (T]A,VB) corresponds to 
a fresh session). B can then compute the session key Kses8icm=K(VA\\VB\\KAB) and 
can proceed to send clock synchronization packets to A using the new session key 
K 
• " session-
6.3 Evaluation 
We now present the results from our implementation, as described in the previous 
section. First we show that the clock synchronization assumptions hold and that we 
can predict packet arrival times at remote nodes with very good accuracy. 
6.3.1 Clock synchronization 
The full clock synchronization algorithm was implemented using the MAC layer times-
tamping described in Section 6.2.2. We run several experiment involving two nodes 
A and B, where nodes exchange messages in the way depicted in Figure 6.1, every 3 
seconds. The packets sent from node A to node B contain the following information: 
• Packet number. Used to identify the clock synchronization packets and for the 
neighbor discovery subprotocol, which is run once the packet number wraps 
around, to ensure the freshness of every packet. 
• Acknowledgment number. Used to refer to the most recent packet received in 
the reverse direction. 
• PBA{n — l). Time at which the last packet (n-th packet) sent by B was received 
by A. 
• SAB- The current estimate of the one way delay from A to B. 
70 
• SAB- The current estimate of the skew of B with respect to A, as an IEEE 754 
double-precision floating point value. 
• MIC(P^s(n — 1)). Authenticator of the previous packet sent. It is calculated 
using HMAC [76], with SHA1 [101] as the hash function. 
• 0"AB(^)- Time at which the current packet was sent. This is actually the last 
field in the packet in order for the interrupt service handler for the SFD pin to 
have enough time to place the timestamp once the SFD interrupt is triggered. 
6.3.2 Validation of clock synchronization 
The clock synchronization behavior depends on two assumptions: 
1. The product of skews SABSBA ~ 1, even when the two are independently 
measured. 
2. Our timestamps are sufficiently accurate to detect small perturbations in the 
RTT. 
To validate these assumptions, we ran the protocol using two motes with no 
attackers present. Samples were collected from over 1600 runs of the synchronization 
protocol. Each sample corresponds to one exchange of packets: one packet from node 
A to B and one packet from B to A. We examined the behavior of the skews, the 
product of the skews, and the accuracy of our calculations of the ETA. 
Figure 6.4 shows the results obtained from calculating skew. We subtracted 1 
from each of the skew values in order to allow the y-axis labels to be meaningful. We 
can observe that even though each skew is measured independently by each of the 
nodes, and even though the skews drift over time, the product of the measured skews 
stays very close to 1, confirming the first assumption mentioned above. 
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Figure 6.5: Accuracy of packet arrival time prediction and RTT behavior 
Figure 6.5 shows the accuracy of our ETA calculations and the RTT behavior over 
time. The median error for the data shown is 0 jis and the average error is 0.5 /xs, 
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Figure 6.6: CDF of the errors in the arrival time prediction 
indicating a high level of accuracy given that the clocks we used had 1 fis resolution. 
For a better perception of the accuracy obtained, Figure 6.6 shows the cumulative 
distribution function of the errors observed. This result shows that nodes are able to 
accurately predict the time at which a receiver will receive a packet according to the 
receiver's clock, and validates the second assumption. 
6.3.3 Man-in-the-middle attacker 
To test our clock synchronization protocol under the influence of man-in-the-middle 
attackers, we implemented the man-in-the-middle functionality in a mote. 
Setup 
The setup, which is shown in Figure 6.7, consists of nodes A and B, a man-in-
the-middle attacker (MITM) (which simply relays all packets heard with a higher 
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Figure 6.7: Experimental setup with an MITM attacker 
transmission power, this relaying is done at the lowest possible level in the network 
stack of TinyOS in order to reduce the variability in forwarding latency), and two 
observer nodes that log all traffic they hear for later analysis. 
The observer nodes are used in order to avoid impacting the calculations per-
formed by nodes A and B, one is placed near node A and the other one near B. 
Nodes A and B are configured to transmit at a very low transmission power so that 
it is the MITM who connects A and B even though they are incapable of direct 
communication with each other. 
Validation of skews with a man-in-the-middle attacker 
In the idealized protocol, we argued that for an attacker to remain undetected, it 
needs to delay packets only by a constant amount of time. We now proceed to 
validate this by measuring the skews when a man-in-the-middle attacker is present. 
If the attacker introduces a non-constant delay with sufficient variation, the skews 
would be affected and the attacker would be detected. For this validation, we ran our 
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clock synchronization protocol on the link created by a man-in-the-middle attacker, 
which as we have just described, simply relays all packets heard. 
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Figure 6.8: Skews observed with an MITM attacker present 
The resulting skews are plotted in Figure 6.8. Once again, we subtracted 1 from 
each of the skew values to allow the y-axis labels to be meaningful. We can observe 
that the product of skews still stays very close to 1, although not as close as the ones 
observed when there is no man-in-the-middle attacker present. Figure 6.9 shows a 
comparison of the product of skews with no MITM and with MITM present. 
We can also observe in Figures 6.10 and Figure 6.11 that the RTT variability is 
slightly higher, and that the prediction accuracy is slightly reduced when comparing 
with the results obtained when there was no man-in-the-middle attacker present. 
These results verify our assumptions that when a man-in-the-middle attacker 
imposes a constant or near-constant delay it does not modify the skew observed 
by the nodes, and the product of the skews remains very close 1, leaving the man-
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Figure 6.10: Round-trip time observed with MITM present 
in-the-middle undetected. The higher variability and reduced accuracy are due to 
the variable processing delay at the man-in-the-middle attacker, caused by its limited 
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computation and communication capabilities. Even with this higher variability, the 
predicted time of arrival is still highly accurate, and therefore, if an attacker linearly 
increases the delay it induces, it will affect the product of skews and our protocol will 
be able to detect it. 
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Figure 6.11: Accuracy of packet arrival time prediction with MITM present 
Implementation of half-duplex attacker detection 
According to Lemma 6.1.2, after having performed the clock synchronization protocol 
and having measured the round-trip time, the sender needs to transmit a packet to 
the receiver which is long enough to make the duty cycle of a half-duplex attacker's 
radio exceed 100%. Due to the CC2420 radio's packet length limit of 127 bytes, it 
is not possible to send such a long packet. One possibility that first suggests itself is 
to contiguously transmit several small packets, each of length I with a gap of length 
g between each successive transmission in order to raise the duty cycle of the link 
above 50%, which in turn becomes a 100% duty cycle for a half-duplex attacker. We 
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specifically need to send n packets such that 
nl 1 
nl + (n - l)g + r 2 ' 
which means that 
Unfortunately, there is an obstacle to pursuing this approach. The very low speed of 
the serial interface that connects the CC2420 radio to the memory takes more time 
to load a packet into the radio's buffer than to transmit the packet, making g > I. 
Thus, we pursue an alternative solution. We load a packet in the radio's buffer, 
and then we pseudo-randomly choose to change 1-4 bytes in the buffer between every 
successive retransmission of the same packet, in a manner known to the sender and 
receiver, but not to any other nodes. On the receiving side, we selectively copy only 
the bytes that we know will change in each packet, instead of reading the whole 
packet. In this way, the time between each successive transmission, becomes smaller 
than the time to transmit a packet, meaning the man-in-the-middle in the attacker 
will not have enough time to read and relay each packet. 
Validation of half-duplex attacker detection 
We built the half-duplex attacker detection mechanism just described and validated 
it by running it with and without the man-in-the-middle attacker. Without the man-
in-the-middle attacker, all tested packets arrived at the estimated time or within 
3 fis of it. With the man-in-the-middle attacker present, the average RTT reaches 
28540 /J,S, so we send 10 successive packets in our challenge. The attacker is forced 
to drop some packets because it is unable to send and receive at the same time, and 
our defense mechanism is able to catch the attacker in each of the over 100 times 
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that we tested our scheme. This shows that we can consistently catch a half-duplex 
man-in-the-middle attacker. 
6.4 Security Analysis 
We now proceed to analyze the security properties of the proposed protocols. We 
specifically want to make sure that 
1. an attacker is not able to modify the skew in a consistent way, and 
2. an attacker can impose only a constant delay. 
To verify that we achieve these goals in our experimental testbed, we need to 
take into account the results presented in Section 6.3, and allow for certain tolerances 
that reflect the behavior of the system when there is no attacker. By setting these 
tolerances, we prevent the man-in-the-middle attacker from making changes such as 
1. consistently modifying the skew by more than one part in 108, 
2. changing the one-way delay by more than 6 jis from one packet to the next 
6.4.1 Consistent skew 
If we set the tolerance of the product of skews to be \SABSBA — 1| < £, with e > 0; 
then the man-in-the-middle attacker will not be able to consistently modify the skew 
by more than 2e without detection. Suppose an attacker wants to decrease S'AB (the 
perceived skew of B with respect to A). Then the attacker needs to make node A 
think that node B's clock is running slower that it actually is. This can be achieved 
by linearly decreasing the delay TUAB it induces. But, from the proof of Theorem 
6.1.1, the attacker would be caught after a finite time due to a causality violation. 
Therefore, the attacker is not able to consistently make S'AB < SAB- A similar 
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argument can be made to demonstrate that an attacker will not able to consistently 
make S'BA < SBA-
Suppose now that the attacker wants to increase S'AB. It needs then to linearly 
increase the delay VHAB it induces. But the increase in S'AB results in an increase of 
the product of skews, and given that the system has established the environmental 
restriction \SABSBA — 1| < £, the attacker needs to make sure that \S'ABS'BA — 1| < e 
to avoid detection. Then, 
SABSBA > I — e 
SAB^BA ^ 1 + £, 
resulting in 
ql < q 1 + e 
oAB S JAB Y_S ' 
and therefore 
S'AB<SAB(l + 2e). 
Furthermore, if the man-in-the-middle attacker does not simultaneously decrease 
the latency in the reverse direction, the resulting RTT variation will allow the detec-
tion of the attacker. 
6.4.2 Consistent one-way delay 
Empirically, by the use of the formula for calculating the estimated arrival time, as 
given by (6.6), we can obtain a bound on the tolerable change in perceived one-way 
delay from one packet to the next. In particular, we can see from Figure 6.5, that 
when there is no man-in-the-middle attacker, \PAB(JI) — PAB(n)\ < 2 JJ,S. Let pAB(n) 
denote the receive time when there is no attacker, and p'AB{n) denote the receive time 
with an attacker present, with m,AB{n) = P'AB^^) ~ PAB{^) > 0 by causality, mAB(n) 
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being the delay induced by the attacker. 
We have established the tolerance |/3AB(™) — PAB{^)\ < 2 yus, and since we will 
also require that \p' Asi71) ~ PAsi71)} — 2 A ,^ we can bound 
\mAB(n) -mAB(n- 1)| < 4 (is. 
Therefore, for an attacker to remain undetected, the delay TUAB it induces should 
not vary more than 4 fj,s from one packet to the next. 
6.4.3 Security of delayed authentication 
Let us now evaluate the security of the delayed authentication mentioned in Section 
6.2.2. 
• All timing information regarding a particular packet is included entirely within 
that packet. This ensures that if an attacker is not capable of forging or mod-
ifying the packet, then the attacker is not able to prevent the receiver from 
correctly timestamping the packet reception. Furthermore, the attacker cannot 
make a node choose wrong values for the timing information required (skew, 
delay) as a result of the delayed authentication. 
• Since a session key is never disclosed, forging a delayed authenticator is as 
hard as forging a non-delayed authenticator. Therefore, the use of delayed 
authentication does not introduce new authentication attacks. 
• Delayed authentication could be vulnerable to Denial-of-Service attacks, where 
the attacker floods the receiver with spurious packets looking to overflow the 
receiver's memory and make it discard legitimate packets. However, in the case 
of the IMote2, there is enough memory to store the spurious packets. This is 
because the interval for the clock synchronization is 3 seconds and the CC2420 
81 
communication rate is 250 kbps, which corresponds to around 92 KB (IMote2 
has 256 KB of RAM and 32MB of DRAM) [65]. 
6.4.4 Security against inter-session replay 
For this analysis, we use the following observations: 
• It is almost impossible to confuse a packet authenticated using the master key 
with a packet authenticated with a session key given that both keys are different 
with a very high probability. 
• It is also almost impossible to confuse a pair of packets authenticated with 
two session keys from different sessions since the session keys are derived using 
SHAl and are therefore different with very high probability. 
• The only possible confusion is between two packets sent with the master key. 
• Only the two first messages sent in the neighbor discovery protocol (INITIATE 
and RESPOND) are authenticated using the master key. 
From the above observations, it is clear we only need to consider the possibility of 
replay of INITIATE and RESPOND messages. Both of these messages are identified by 
a type field (to indicate if the message is either an INITIATE or a RESPOND message) 
and a nonce, which as we mentioned in Section 6.2.3, is a randomly generated number 
used to ensure the request for a session is fresh. 
• If an attacker replays an old INITIATE message to node B, and the receiver 
accepts it as authentic, it will create a RESPOND packet with a fresh nonce TJB, 
which would result in a different session key that the attacker is not able to 
generate. 
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• If an attacker replays an old RESPOND message to node A, then node A will 
find out that the nonce T\A does not correspond to any outstanding INITIATE 
message it has, ignoring the message. 
Therefore, the replay of messages between different sessions is not more likely to 
succeed than sending a forged message authenticated with a random key. 
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CHAPTER 7 
SECURE NETWORK-WIDE 
CLOCK SYNCHRONIZATION 
AND TOPOLOGY DISCOVERY 
We now address the problem of secure clock synchronization in a multihop network. 
Further, we show how the network-wide synchronization can be used for secure topol-
ogy discovery. In turn, secure topology discovery can be used for network operation, 
including routing and transport. Our approach to network-wide synchronization will 
build upon the link synchronization scheme described in Chapter 6. 
We use the same notation as in Section 6.1.1, and assume the following: 
• The network is modeled as a graph G — (V, E), where V represents the set of 
nodes in the network, and E represents the links connecting the nodes. 
• Clocks are affine. 
• Nodes in V can accurately timestamp packets. 
• The endpoints of every link in E share a private key, which they use to provide 
authentication and confidentiality. 
• The endpoints of every link in E are legitimate, that is, no node in the set V 
has been compromised. 
• The nodes in V are half-duplex. 
• A man-in-the-middle attacker 
1. is a node not included in V, which modifies the characteristics of a link 
(a, b) G E, in order to disrupt the clock synchronization between a and b, 
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2. is not able to break the cryptography used in any link in E, 
3. can be half-duplex, or full duplex, and 
4. is free to do as it pleases, but desires to remain undetected. 
• In every well-behaved link (a,b) G E, the product of the skews a and b have 
with respect to each other, is approximately 1 (i.e., Sat,Sba « 1), and the RTT 
stays fairly constant. This stems from the results in Section 6.3.2. 
The main properties of the protocol presented in this chapter are: 
Detection The protocol can detect links that misbehave (i.e., compromised links), 
and tag them. 
Dissemination On detection of a compromised link, a node can disseminate an 
"alert" throughout the network. 
Isolation Whenever a node A needs to communicate with another node B, and 
the set of paths between them contains one or more paths with misbehaving 
links, node A can remove the path(s) that contain the misbehaved links after a 
verification process, effectively isolating them. 
This protocol therefore results in a network-wide consistent clock. That is, for any 
two nodes A and B in the network, the skews obtained through the k different paths 
between them, Pi, P2,Ps, ••-, Pk, are all approximately equal. If the skews obtained 
do not obey this property, then we say the skews are inconsistent, which implies 
that one or more links have been compromised, and we therefore need to remove the 
incorrectly behaving ones. 
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7.1 The Main Ideas 
To achieve the secure network-wide clock synchronization, each node in the network 
examines every path it uses to reach the other nodes in search of misbehaving links, 
i.e., links under the control of man-in-the-middle attackers. When a misbehaving link 
is found, its usage is discontinued. In order for a node A to examine every path to 
all other nodes in the network, node A first learns the topology of the network. The 
topology learning process, and the detection of misbehaving links, proceed hand-in-
hand in an incremental fashion. This process is divided into four steps: 
1. Single link checking. Nodes synchronize with their neighbors, and check if the 
direct link they share is behaving correctly. 
2. Neighborhood check. Every node A sends a list to its valid neighbors that 
includes information about each of them. 
3. Network consistency check. The valid neighbor lists are processed by each of 
the nodes in a way that allows them to discover the existence of new nodes, 
and check for possible misbehaving links in the newly learned paths. 
4. Removal of network inconsistencies. When the different paths learned by node 
A to reach node B are inconsistent, a test is performed on each of the paths to 
determine which one(s) must be removed from use. 
7.1.1 Single link checking 
The goal in this step is for nodes to synchronize with their neighbors and check if the 
direct link is behaving correctly. This is done by the following procedure: 
• Every node in the network synchronizes with each of its neighbors using the 
protocol described in Section 6.1, with the goal of detecting the existence of 
misbehaving links. 
86 
• To detect the misbehaving links, every pair of nodes A and B sharing a link, 
verifies that SABSBA ~ 1- Otherwise, they conclude that an attacker has taken 
control of the link and its changing its behavior. 
With this step, we are guaranteeing the detection of misbehaving links. 
7.1.2 Neighborhood check 
In the second step, we use the information collected in the first step to isolate the 
misbehaving links through the following procedure: 
• Each of the nodes in the network forms a list of valid neighbors. Node A 
considers node B a valid neighbor if SABSBA ~ 1-
• The valid neighbor list will only be sent to each of the valid neighbors, and it 
will be encrypted using the private key shared with such valid neighbor. 
• The neighbor list includes the following information for each of the valid neigh-
bors: neighbor ID, skew, and one-way delay. 
By not including information regarding the compromised links in the valid neigh-
bor lists, we prevent their use not only by the nodes that detected them, but by any 
other node in the network since they will not be aware of the existence of such links. 
We are, therefore, guaranteeing the isolation of the compromised links detected in 
this step. 
7.1.3 Network consistency check 
The goal in this step is for nodes to discover the existence of nodes not directly 
connected to them, as well as checking the learned paths for possible misbehaving 
links. This is done by the following procedure: 
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• Each node A processes the lists of valid neighbors it has received, and updates a 
table that includes the information for the nodes reachable from A, henceforth 
referred to as reachable nodes table. This table contains the following informa-
tion for each node which node A can reach, either directly or by multihop: node 
ID, validity flag, aggregate skew, aggregate one-way delay, distance (number of 
hops), and path (sequence of intermediate hops). 
• Updating the reachable nodes table involves calculating the aggregate skew, 
and aggregate one-way delay for nodes included in the lists received, for which 
there is no information in the reachable nodes table. It also involves verifying 
the consistency of the end-to-end skews for nodes for which there is already 
information in the reachable nodes table. The latter needs to be done in case a 
different aggregate skew for a node is calculated over a path that is different to 
the one previously discovered. For instance, if node A previously found a path 
Pi to node B through node X with an aggregate skew <SAB,PI = SAXSXB, and 
now finds another path P2 to node B through node Y with an aggregate skew 
SAB,P2 = SAYSYB, then P\ and P2 are considered consistent if SAB,PX ~ SAB,P2 
within an acceptable tolerance. 
• After processing the lists of valid neighbors received, every node has informa-
tion in its reachable nodes table on how to reach its direct neighbors and their 
two-hop neighbors. In order for the nodes to discover their three-hop neigh-
bors, the information in the reachable nodes tables must be exchanged between 
neighbors. For this, every node copies the contents of its reachable nodes table 
to a reachable list, and sends it to its valid neighbors (in a similar fashion as 
the valid neighbor list exchange of step 2) 
• The processing of the reachable lists received, similar to the processing of the 
valid neighbors lists, allow the nodes to discover nodes one hop farther. If every 
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node sends a reachable list to its neighbors every time there is a change in its 
reachable nodes table, i.e., a new node or an inconsistency is discovered as a 
result of the processing of the reachable lists received, eventually every node will 
discover the network topology. It should be noted that we are actually carrying 
out a procedure similar to the one performed by the distributed Bellman-Ford 
algorithm [43], only that instead of computing a minimum cost path, we are 
aggregating the skew and one way-delay. 
With this step, we are guaranteeing the detection of inconsistent skews, and the 
dissemination of information regarding such inconsistencies throughout the network. 
7.1.4 Removal of network inconsistencies 
The goal of the last step is for nodes to remove any inconsistency in the set of paths 
connecting them. This is carried out by the following procedure: 
• This step is executed by a node A only when it needs to communicate with 
another node B. Our approach is an on-demand approach. There is no need 
for node A to pro-actively execute this step for each node it can reach. 
• This step allows for the removal of inconsistencies in the set of paths connecting 
A and B, by testing each path. The testing process involves sending a packet 
along the nodes in the path to be tested, and determining if such packet arrived 
at the estimated time of arrival, which is calculated using (6.3). If the packet 
does not arrive by the estimated time of arrival (within a certain tolerance), 
then the path is deemed inconsistent, and is removed from the reachable nodes 
table. 
• This step uses public key signatures to provide authentication and integrity, in 
order assure nodes as to the origin and content of the messages received [102]. 
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With this step, we are preventing the use of any path that include compromised 
links. 
7.1.5 An example 
Figure 7.1: Example network to illustrate secure multihop protocol execution 
We now illustrate the way in which the nodes discover other nodes outside their 
neighborhood, and the way in which they handle the possible skew inconsistencies, 
by using the example network shown in Figure 7.1. Each vertex represents a node in 
the network, and each edge represents a link which effectively makes them neighbors 
(i.e., node 7 has nodes 3, 6 and 8 as neighbors, while node 1 has nodes 2 and 5 as its 
neighbors). All of the nodes in the network synchronize with their neighbors. After 
that, they each check the links to their neighbors to detect misbehaving links. 
Assume nodes 5 and 3 have already synchronized with their neighbors, and that 
node 3 has detected that the link it shares with node 4 is misbehaving (63,454,3 7^  
1). As shown in Figure 7.2, node 5 would then exchange the following list with its 
neighbors, nodes 1 and 6 
ListOf Neighbors*, = {(1, 55,i, <55,i)> (6, 55,6, S6J)} , 
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Algorithm 1 Securely synchronize clocks in a multihop network 
Require: Node's clocks are trustworthy 
Ensure: Nodes have a network-wise consistent clock 
Step 1: Single link check (between all neighboring nodes A and B) 
A performs clock synchronization with B. 
Node A obtains the skew SAB and the one-way delay 5AB-
Node B obtains SBA and SBA-
Both nodes check that SAB * SBA ~ 1-
Step 2: Neighborhood check 
Each of the nodes in the network verifies the validity of the links shared with its 
neighbors, and forms a valid neighbor list which is to be sent to all valid neighbors. 
The list includes the measured skew and one-way delay for each of the valid neigh-
bors. 
Step 3: Network consistency check 
Once it has been determined that a link is valid and can be used, currentNode 
sends a list to the currentValidNeighbor. The list contains all reachable nodes 
that have valid skews, where valid skew means: 
1. if a node is a direct neighbor, then an inverse skew relationship holds. 
2. if a node is multihop reachable, then the aggregate skews from different paths 
are consistent. 
This step is run until all paths have been explored, that is, all valid reachable nodes 
have been discovered. If a node is reachable from node A, but does not have valid 
aggregate skews, node A tags the node as invalid, and propagate the tags out to 
inform the other nodes of the inconsistency. 
Step 4: Eliminate network skew inconsistencies 
If a node A needs to communicate with a node B that is not a direct neighbor, 
and node A has detected inconsistent skews in the set of paths between A and B, 
node A then tests each of the inconsistent paths by sending a signed message to 
node B. 
The reception timestamps of the messages sent by A are returned by B and are used 
to discard paths that do not yield the true skew. This is determined by comparing 
the estimated time of arrival with the actual time of arrival of the messages sent. 
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while node 3 would exchange the following list with nodes 2 and 7, 
ListOf Neighbors* = {(2, S3,2, h,i), (7, 53i7) 83J)} . 
Figure 7.2: Neighborhood check step in nodes 3 and 5 
To simplify the illustration we will only describe the events in node 7 for the 
remainder of the example, noting that similar operations are executed for each node 
in the network. 
Figure 7.3: Lists of neighbors received in node 7 
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The different shades in the nodes appearing in Figures 7.3-7.7 denote the distance 
they have with respect to the node of interest. If a node is not shaded, then node 7 
is still not aware of its existence yet. In Figure 7.3 we observe that node 7 receives 
the neighbor list from its neighbors, nodes 3, 6, and 8. Node 7 proceeds to update 
its reachable nodes table with the information contained in these lists; for instance, 
the processing of the list received from node 3 results in the following operations: 
• Node 3, which sent ListOf Neighbors?, is already in the reachable nodes table 
since it is a direct neighbor of node 7, with a distance of 1, a valid flag, 67,3 as 
skew, and ^ 3 as one-way delay 
• Node 2, included in ListOf Neighbor s3 is not in the reachable nodes table. 
Node 7 calculates its distance, which is calculated to be 2, since it comes from 
a neighbor list (1 hop to node 3 plus another hop to node 2), the aggregate 
skew as 67,2 = £7,353,2) and the aggregate one-way delay as <57i2 = £7,3 + <53)2. 
This information, along with (3) as the sequence of intermediate hops, is stored 
in the reachable nodes table and it is marked as valid since this is the first 
aggregate skew node 7 calculates with respect to node 2. 
Figure 7.4: Node 7 exchanges its reachable list with its neighbors 
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When all the lists of neighbors received in node 7 are processed, node 7 is able 
to reach nodes 3,6,8,4,2, and 5. The fact that the processing of these lists resulted 
in changes in the reachable nodes table of node 7, means that now node 7 needs to 
inform the neighboring nodes of such changes, as can be seen in Figure 7.4. For this, 
node 7 copies the contents of its reachable nodes table into the list ReachableList-j. 
To illustrate the content of the reachable list, we show the ReachableList7 being 
sent in Figure 7.4 (the fields for each of the nodes included are node ID, validity flag, 
distance, skew, one-way delay, and path): 
ReachableList7 = { 
(6, valid, 1, SV.eA.e, ()), 
(2, uaZid, 2, 57,2, £7,2, (3)), 
( 5 , ^ ^ , 2 , 5 7 , 5 , 57>5, (6))} 
(3,uaZid,l,57,3,*r,3,()), 
(S, valid, 1,57,8,^7,8, ()), 
(4,uaW,2,57,4,57,4,(8)), 
Distance from node ?: t ) ( * ) • ( • 
ReaetaMeLisig 
Figure 7.5: Node 7 receives reachable lists from its neighbors 
All the other nodes conduct a similar processing of the neighbors lists they receive, 
which results in updates to their reachable nodes tables. For instance, nodes 3 and 6 
become aware of new nodes they can reach, and therefore form a reachable list that 
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is sent to node 7 (and their other neighbors), as can be seen in Figure 7.5. 
Figure 7.6: Node 7 exchanges its reachable list with neighbors again 
The arrival of a reachable list in node 7 triggers an update of the reachable nodes 
table, as do the neighbor lists. In this case, the update results in the addition of node 
1, which previously was not reachable from node 7, which in turn results in the need 
for node 7 to send another reachable list to its neighbors, as shown in Figure 7.6 
Let us assume now that the aggregate skews that node 7 has calculated with 
respect to node 1 are different for the two paths it has learned so far, that is, 
<5,7,3'S'3,2'S'2,i 7^  5,7)6<S,6;5S'5]i. This means that node 7 needs to store the information 
for both paths, as well as mark node 1 as invalid in the table. The fact that node 
1 has been marked as invalid will be communicated to the other nodes in the net-
work by means of the reachable list that will propagated due to the changes in the 
reachable nodes table. 
If at a later time, node 7 needs to communicate with node 1, then node 7 will first 
have to remove the inconsistent skews. This removal of inconsistencies will involve 
the following message exchanges illustrated by Figure 7.7, where A —» B: M means 
A sends message M to B, and {M}^A means message M is signed by node A: 
• 7 —• 3: resynchronize with 2, and append the message {noncei}^7 
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Distance from node 7: *-; (*) C3 
inconsistencies found to node 
1, test first skew 
(a) Signed message sent to node 1 to test for inconsistency in first path 
Distance from node 7: fcfti™} P*H-'I felfe 
(b) Signed reply that includes the time of reception 
Figure 7.7: Node 7 wants to communicate with node 1 but needs to first remove the 
inconsistencies 
• 3 —> 2: resynchronize with 1, and append the message {noncei}#7 
2 —* 1: {noncei}/c7 
1 -* 2: p7,iO), (P7,i(n). {noncei}^}*! 
2 ^ 3 : p7,i(n)i {P7,i(w)> {nonce i}^}^ 
3 -> 7: {p7,i(n), {nonce i}^}^ . 
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Once this message exchange is complete, node 7 is able to determine if the aggre-
gate skew in this path is valid, by verifying if the message arrived at node 1 at the 
estimated time of arrival. This estimated arrival time is calculated using(6.3). If the 
skew along this path is valid, we remove the remaining skews, otherwise we proceed 
to test the next skew in the table. 
Using the protocol described by Algorithm 1, the nodes in a network are able to se-
curely synchronize their clocks by detecting and discontinuing the use of misbehaving 
links created by man-in-the-middle attackers. At the same time, the protocol allows 
the nodes to securely learn the topology of the network. 
7.2 Implementation 
The main goal of the prototype implementation is to verify the properties of Algo-
rithm 1. We note that at this stage we do not address efficiency aspects, which can 
employ several optimizations. 
7.2.1 Setup 
The implementation has been performed on a testbed comprised of 25 Crossbow 
IMote2 sensor nodes, shown in Figure 7.8, using TinyOS 2.1, and the implementation 
discussed in Section 6.2 as a starting point. Figure 7.8 also shows the presence of 
6 additional motes that log every packet they hear for later analysis. The reason 
for using these additional six motes is to keep the nodes participating in the clock 
synchronization process from having to handle all the interrupts caused by the packet 
logging, which could adversely affect the timestamp measurements on the motes. 
The link topology used in the experiments is shown in Figure 7.9. This topology 
was enforced by software (MAC filtering), similar to the implementation discussed in 
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Figure 7.8: Testbed for the implementation of the secure network-wide synchroniza-
tion protocol 
Section 4.2. 
We now discuss the implementation of the valid neighbor list and reachable list 
exchanges, as well as of the process of removing the inconsistent skews. 
7.2.2 Exchange of valid neighbor lists 
When the clock synchronization between two neighboring nodes A and B is complete, 
each of these two nodes has enough information to execute a single link check. This 
is done by multiplying the estimated skew of one node with respect to the other 
(SAB * SBA) and checking if the product is approximately 1. As mentioned in Section 
6.3.1, a skew is represented by an IEEE 754 double-precision floating point value. 
Given that there can be variations due to interrupt-handling in the nodes, as well 
as changes in voltage or temperature that affect the clock drift [103], we allow the 
product to be within a certain tolerance, which in our case is 10~7. 
Every node in the network performs the same verification for all the neighbors 
it has, and after every verification, the information it has regarding the neighboring 
node is updated to reflect the validity of the link they share. In order to handle a 
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Figure 7.9: Link topology of the 25 nodes in the testbed 
dynamic topology, a linked list structure is used to store this information. 
Once a node has checked all the direct links it has, it constructs a packet (or set 
of packets given the CC2420 radio's packet size limit of 127 bytes), that includes the 
following information for each of its valid neighbors: neighbor ID, validity, distance 
to the neighbor (1 for direct link neighbors), skew and one-way delay. The packets 
are encrypted using the session key generated with the protocol described in Section 
6.2.3 before sending them to each of the valid neighbors. 
7.2.3 Exchange of reachable lists 
Whenever node A receives a valid neighbor list sent by node B, the reachable node 
table in A is updated according to the following rules: 
• If the valid neighbor list includes information for a node C not currently in A's 
99 
table, then A calculates the aggregate skew and aggregate one-way delay by 
combining the corresponding values advertised in the list for node C, with the 
skew and one-way delay that node A has with respect to node B. The aggregate 
values are then placed in a new record in the table for node C, along with the 
updated distance, validity and set of intermediate nodes in the path. 
• If the valid neighbor list includes information for a node C already in A's 
table, then A calculates the aggregate skew and aggregate one-way delay by 
combining the corresponding values advertised in the list for node C, with the 
skew and one-way delay that node A has with respect to node B, and compares 
the computed aggregate skew with the one already stored in the table. If the 
computed aggregate skew is consistent (e.g., their values are within a tolerance 
of 10 -6), then the information for node C remains as valid; otherwise, the 
computed aggregate values are added to the record for node C, along with the 
distance and set of intermediate nodes in the path, and node C is now marked 
invalid. 
Rather than having the nodes sending the reachable lists every time a change in 
their reachable nodes table is made, which could lead to a high traffic load, the nodes 
do the following: When a list is received, a timer is started to allow for the arrival 
of more lists that could trigger additional updates. Once the timer is fired, the node 
determines whether the reachable nodes table was modified or not by the processing 
of the received lists. If the table has changed, the node constructs a packet (or set 
of packets) in the same way it constructed the valid neighbor list, that includes the 
same information for each node as in the valid neighbor list, with the addition of the 
set of intermediate nodes that form the path to the node. This list is then encrypted 
using the corresponding session key and sent to each of the neighbors. 
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Although in Section 7.1 we referred to the neighbor list and the reachable list 
as different entities, in the implementation, given that their contents are practically-
identical, the same data structure is used to represent either one of them. By using 
the same data structure, the size complexity of the code is reduced. 
7.2.4 Removal of network inconsistencies 
In the description given in Section 7.1.4, we mentioned that this step uses public key 
signatures to provide authentication and integrity. Although it has been shown that 
public key cryptography is feasible on sensor nodes [104-106], the resources required 
in terms of running time and memory are still to high. For this reason, for the 
implementation of this part of Algorithm 1, we substituted the public key signature 
scheme by a delayed authenticator scheme. This latter scheme is the same as the 
one we used to handle the problem mentioned in Section 6.2.2, of not having enough 
time to compute an authenticator for the packet being currently sent, and therefore 
including it in the next packet. By doing this substitution, we are also able to reuse 
the code already developed to solve that problem. 
7.3 Evaluation 
We now present the results of the implementation. 
Several experiments have been run on the testbed with the following scenarios: 
1. No attackers in the network. 
2. Attackers in the network. To make the nodes think there is an attacker present 
in the network, we proceed as follows: 
(a) We make two nodes A and B sharing a link L advertise incorrect skews 
to each other, resulting in the immediate isolation of the link since SAB * 
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SBA ± 1. 
(b) We make one of the neighbors of a given node A advertise an incorrect 
skew with respect to A to its other neighbors. Whenever any of the nodes 
in the network uses this incorrect information with respect to A to update 
their reachable nodes table, it will result in inconsistencies that will be 
propagated throughout the network. These inconsistencies in the reachable 
nodes tables of the nodes with respect to A, will force a node that wants 
to communicate with node A to remove the inconsistencies first. 
All the experiments that were run exhibited similar results in all the scenarios 
mentioned above: 
1. The product of the skews between nodes in the network stayed very close to 1, 
deviating only about one part in 107, even on multihop links. 
2. The invalid links are either isolated from the beginning (since they are not 
advertised), or the nodes stop using them as a result of the last step of the 
protocol (removal of network skew inconsistencies). 
In Figures 7.10-7.12, we show the resulting skew estimates of nodes 1, 13, and 
22 with respect to all other network nodes (the x-axis represents the ID of the other 
nodes, referring to Figure 7.9 for the underlying link topology) in a particular run 
with the following characteristics: 
• Nodes 4 and 5 advertised incorrect skews to each other, resulting in the isolation 
of the link between them. By analyzing the data collected by the loggers, we 
could verify that the link was not included in the valid neighbor list exchanged 
by either node, and therefore, that no path in the network included this link. 
• Node 6 advertises an incorrect skew with respect to node 7, resulting in skew 
inconsistencies with respect to node 7 in the reachable nodes tables of all the 
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other nodes. This was verified by looking at the reachable lists exchanged 
by the nodes. To verify that the removal of network inconsistencies actually 
works, node 1 is asked to establish communication with node 7, resulting in the 
elimination of path (1, 6, 7). 
We can see in Figures 7.10-7.12 that the product of the measured skews stays very 
close to 1, deviating only about one part in 107, even with nodes that are not direct 
neighbors. 
To summarize, using the ideas described in Chapter 6 to secure the clock synchro-
nization over a single link as a foundation, we have developed a secure network-wide 
clock synchronization protocol capable of detecting man-in-the-middle attackers that 
cannot be prevented by the sole use of cryptographic techniques and that could dis-
rupt the clock synchronization service, or other services such as routing. This protocol 
also allows us to securely discover the network topology, a functionality that enables 
us to provide further services such as secure link state routing. The prototype imple-
mentation, which has not been optimized for efficiency, has shown the feasibility of 
the protocol. 
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Figure 7.10: Skews observed by node 1 in a particular run of the experiment. 
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Figure 7.11: Skews observed by node 13 in a particular run of the experiment. 
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Figure 7.12: Skews observed by node 22 in a particular run of the experiment. 
105 
CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE 
WORK 
In this dissertation we have studied clock synchronization protocols for multihop 
wireless sensor networks. 
In Chapter 4, we presented a clock synchronization protocol tailored to wireless 
networks, that exploits the broadcast nature of the wireless medium, is fully dis-
tributed, uses asynchronous messages, and requires no topological constructions such 
as rooted trees or hierarchies. These features make the protocol more suitable for 
dynamic topologies, which can be caused by mobility or node failures, than other 
protocols such as TPSN [16], where a change in the topology requires running an 
algorithm to reconstruct the hierarchical structure needed for the synchronization 
phase. 
The protocol has been successfully implemented in TinyOS 1.1 [60] using a testbed 
of MICA2 motes. Its performance has been evaluated and compared with the leading 
protocol in use, FTSP [17]. We have shown that our protocol provides a better 
accuracy and a lower variance. A lower variance may actually be even more important 
than a good accuracy for some applications such as TDMA communication. 
In Chapter 6, we present a secure clock synchronization protocol designed to de-
tect man-in-the-middle attacks. These attacks cannot be prevented by merely using 
cryptographic techniques, but this protocol is capable of detecting them using timing 
information alone, with certain conditions. The protocol has been implemented in 
TinyOS 2.1 using IMote2 motes with very positive results. The evaluation of the im-
plementation shows that a misbehaving link caused by a man-in-the-middle attacker 
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can be detected if it causes inconsistent skews and variable round-trip delays that 
result from the non-constant delays induced by the attacker, and that a misbehaving 
link caused by a half-duplex man-in-the-middle attacker can be detected even when 
it induces only a constant delay. 
In Chapter 7, we presented a secure network-wide clock synchronization proto-
col. It extends the secure clock synchronization protocol for a single link presented 
in Chapter 6. The protocol is capable of detecting man-in-the-middle attacks and 
removing the compromised links from use. The protocol has been implemented in 
TinyOS 2.1 using a testbed of 25 IMote2 motes, showing the feasibility of the protocol. 
8.1 Future Work 
A more efficient implementation needs to be built in order to reduce the number 
of messages exchanged as well as the cryptographic operations involved. A more 
thorough evaluation of the implementation with different topologies and the presence 
of a real man-in-the-middle attacker needs to be performed as well as a complete 
study to determine the number of attackers that the secure clock synchronization 
protocol could withstand, while still providing a good synchronization. Construction 
of services such as secure source routing on top of the secure network-wide clock 
synchronization protocol, is an important next step. 
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